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Abstract
Configurable and Sound Static Analysis of JavaScript:
Techniques and Applications
Vineeth Kashyap
JavaScript is widespread. Web developers use JavaScript to enrich user experi-
ence via dynamic content ranging from scripts to enhance a web page’s appearance,
to full-blown web applications, to extending the functionality of web browsers in the
form of browser addons. Desktop developers use JavaScript, e.g., for OS applications
in Windows 8. JavaScript’s growing prominence means that secure, correct, and fast
JavaScript code is becoming ever more critical. Static analysis traditionally plays a
large role in providing these characteristics: it can be used for security auditing, error-
checking, debugging, optimization, and program refactoring, among other uses. Thus,
a sound, precise static analysis platform for JavaScript can be of enormous advantage.
In this thesis, we present our work on creating a sound, precise, configurable and
fast static analysis for JavaScript called JSAI that we have made openly available to the
research community. JSAI is both a practical tool for JavaScript static analysis and also
a research platform for experimenting with static analysis techniques. JSAI showcases
a number of novel techniques to soundly compute a combination of type inference,
pointer analysis, control-flow analysis, string analysis, and integer and boolean con-
x
stant propagation for JavaScript programs. It also provides a unique method for modu-
larly configuring analysis precision that is based on fundamental new insights into the
theory of static analysis. We describe precision-increasing techniques for the analysis
using type refinement; and performance-increasing techniques for the analysis based on
parallelization of JSAI. As an example use-case for JSAI, we discuss a novel security
analysis for JavaScript-based browser addon vetting.
xi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
JavaScript is pervasive. While it began as a client-side webpage scripting language,
JavaScript has grown hugely in scope and popularity and is used to extend the func-
tionality of web browsers via browser addons, to develop desktop applications (e.g., for
Windows 8 [3]) and server-side applications (e.g., using Node.js [4]), and to develop
mobile phone applications (e.g., for Firefox OS [5]). JavaScript’s growing prominence
means that secure, correct, maintainable, and fast JavaScript code is becoming ever
more critical. Sound static analysis traditionally plays a large role in providing these
characteristics: it can be used for security auditing, error-checking, debugging, opti-
mization, program understanding, refactoring, and more.
However, JavaScript’s inherently dynamic nature and many unintuitive quirks cause
great difficulty for static analysis. For example, a simple line of code in JavaScript to
access an index of a string as given in Figure 1.1 results in potentially several implicit
type checks and implicit type conversions, that can lead to invocation of user-defined
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code (lines 16 and 27 call methods that can be overridden by the user). Thus, unlike
other traditional languages like C/C++ and Java, the static analysis cannot rely on exis-
tence of a control flow graph to begin with1—we need to perform an detailed analysis
to compute the control flow graph.
In addition, static analysis of JavaScript is a very young research field, and the
right analysis abstractions are not yet known. The abstractions in a static analysis (like
abstract data domains and control-flow sensitivities like context-, heap-, and path- sen-
sitivities) can have a significant impact on the performance and precision of the anal-
ysis. Such abstractions vary between programming languages—even between differ-
ent application domains within the same language. All the existing static analyses for
JavaScript (and for most other languages) bake-in such abstractions, making it hard to
explore and experiment to find the right abstractions.
Our goal is to overcome these difficulties and provide a formally specified, well-
tested, configurable and sound static analysis platform for JavaScript, immediately use-
ful for a variety of client analyses.
1One can start the analysis with an unsound control flow graph and dynamically add edges during the
analysis, but this is ad-hoc and is prone to errors.
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1: if myString is null or undefined then
2: type-error
3: else
4: // convert myString to an object first?
5: if myString is a primitive then
6: obj = toObject(myString)
7: else
8: obj = myString
9: end if
10: // convert i to a string
11: // case 1: i is a primitive
12: if i is a primitive then
13: prop = toString(i)
14: else
15: if i.toString is callable then
16: tmp = i.toString()
17: else
18: goto line 26
19: end if
20: end if
21: // case 2: i is not a primitive, but i.toString() is
22: if tmp is a primitive then
23: prop = toString(tmp)
24: // case 3: i.toString() is not a primitive; try i.valueOf()
25: else
26: if i.valueOf is callable then
27: tmp2 = i.valueOf()
28: else
29: type-error
30: end if
31: if tmp2 is a primitive then
32: prop = toString(tmp2)
33: else
34: type-error
35: end if
36: end if
37: // retrieve the property from the object
38: x = obj.prop
39: end if
Figure 1.1: The semantics of var x = myString[i ];
3
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1.1 Key Insights and Thesis Statement
There were several key ideas and insights that shaped this thesis; we discuss the
most important of them here.
• Control-flow sensitivity (ex: flow-, context-, heap-, path-sensitivity, predicate
abstraction, property simulation) can expressed modularly from the rest of the
analysis specification. This is achieved by describing control-flow sensitivity
as a widening operator parameterized by an equivalence relation that partitions
states according to an abstraction of the program’s history of computation.
• A sound analysis for JavaScript can be achieved by formally specifying the con-
crete and abstract semantics for JavaScript and connecting the two semantics
using abstract interpretation. Specifying semantics in a executable manner using
small-step operational abstract machine semantics allows for testing and modu-
lar specification of the analysis. The validity of the given concrete semantics for
JavaScript can be claimed by thorough testing against a commercial JavaScript
engine. Modular control-flow sensitivity allows for experimentation with a wide
range of sensitivities for JavaScript analysis.
• Viewing analysis of JavaScript as a state transition system shows that it is highly
amenable to parallelization. One can think of control-flow sensitivity used in
the analysis as selection of states to merge (by over-approximating the merged
4
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states)—introducing points of synchronization in a embarrassingly parallel ex-
ploration.
• The concept of type refinement—where the abstract type information propagated
by the static analysis is refined within each branch of a conditional—can vastly
aid the precision of JavaScript analysis, particularly when applied to the implicit
conditional checks that do not show up in surface syntax.
• Specifying security policies for JavaScript-based browser addons using security
signatures (detailed summary of interesting information flows and API usages)
and automatically inferring them can help security auditing of third-party addons
submitted for code-review in more automated manner. Our sound JavaScript
analysis can be used to build such an automatic security signature inference en-
gine.
These insights lead us to my thesis statement: Configurable, sound, precise, and
fast static analysis for JavaScript is feasible. We demonstrate this by building a
formalized abstract interpreter for JavaScript called JSAI. JSAI forms the basis
for a multitude of useful client analyses including security, error- checking, and
program understanding.
5
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1.2 Contributions and Overview of the Thesis
The main contributions of this thesis (and the chapters that detail them) include:
• We provide a formal theoretical foundation for building configurable (with a
wide-range of control-flow sensitivities) abstract interpreter [82] using widening
for control flow (Chapter 2)2.
• We build a configurable and sound abstract interpreter for JavaScript called JSAI [95].
JSAI is open-source, and includes a formally specified concrete and abstract se-
mantics for JavaScript. The abstract semantics specifies a fundamental static
analysis for JavaScript that can be used to build a variety of clients on top—the
analysis is a combination of type inference, pointer analysis, control-flow analy-
sis, string, number and boolean analysis with novel abstract string and object do-
mains for JavaScript. Our formalisms and code have been positively evaluated by
the FSE 2014 Artifact Evaluation Committee. We evaluate JSAI’s performance
and precision on a comprehensive benchmark suite comprising of multiple appli-
cation domains and obtain novel insights by experimenting with a large number
of context-sensitivities (Chapter 3).
• We improve the precision of JSAI using type refinement [97]—in particular by re-
fining based on implicit checks on types by the JavaScript semantics—and show
2The first author of this work is Ben Hardekopf, I am a co-author.
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that up to 86% precision improvement can be obtained on a static type-error de-
tection client without affecting performance (Chapter 4).
• We parallelize JSAI [57] based on the insights highlighted in the previous section
to obtain speedups between 2 − 4× on average with a super-linear maximum of
36.9× on 12 hardware threads when compared to the sequential version (Chap-
ter 5)3. Our parallelized version of JSAI has been positively evaluated by the
CGO 2015 Artifact Evaluation Committee.
• We show the usefulness of JSAI by building a client security auditing analysis
for vetting JavaScript-based browser addons [96]. We describe a novel notion
of security signature for browser addons and construct an analysis to infer these
automatically, and empirically evaluate it on benchmark consisting of real-world
addons from the official Mozilla addon repository (Chapter 6).
3The first author of this work is Kyle Dewey, I am a co-author.
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Chapter 2
Constructing Configurable and Sound
Abstract Interpreters via Widening for
Control-Flow
2.1 Introduction
A program analysis designer must balance three opposing characteristics: sound-
ness, precision, and tractability. An important dimension of this tradeoff is control-
flow sensitivity: how precisely the analysis adheres to realizable program execution
paths. Examples include various types of path sensitivity (e.g., property simulation [54]
and predicate abstraction [39]), flow sensitivity (e.g., flow-insensitive [42] and flow-
sensitive [101]), and context sensitivity (e.g., k-CFA [131] and object sensitivity [120]).
By tracking realizable execution paths more precisely, the analysis may compute more
precise results but also may become less tractable. Thus, choosing the right control-flow
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sensitivity for a particular analysis is crucial for finding the sweet-spot that combines
useful results with tractable performance.
We present a set of insights and formalisms that allow control-flow sensitivity to be
treated as an independent concern, separately from the rest of the analysis design and
implementation. This separation of concerns allows the analysis designer to empirically
experiment with many different analysis sensitivities in a guaranteed sound manner,
without modifying the analysis design or implementation. These sensitivities are not
restricted to currently known strategies; the designer can easily develop and experiment
with new sensitivities as well. Besides allowing manual exploration of potential new
sensitivities, we also describe a mechanism to automatically create new sensitivities,
based on the insight that the space of control-flow sensitivities forms a lattice. The
meet and join operators of this lattice can be used to construct novel sensitivities from
existing ones without requiring manual intervention.
Key Insights. Our key insight is that control-flow sensitivity is a form of widening,
and that we can exploit this to separate control-flow sensitivity from the rest of the
analysis. This chapter describes control-flow sensitivity as a widening operator param-
eterized by an equivalence relation that partitions states according to an abstraction of
the program’s history of computation. This widening-based view of control-flow sen-
sitivity has both theoretical and practical implications: it generalizes and modularizes
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existing insights into control-flow sensitivity, and provides the analysis designer with a
method for implementing and evaluating many possible sensitivities in a modular way.
A common technique to formalize control-flow sensitivity is to abstract a program’s
concrete control flow as an abstract trace (i.e., some notion of the history of computa-
tion that led to a particular program point). There are many ways to design such an
abstraction, including ad-hoc values that represent control-flow (e.g., the timestamps
of van Horn and Might [138]), designed abstractions with a direct connection to the
concrete semantics (e.g., the mementoes of Nielson and Nielson [123]), and calculated
abstractions that result from the composition of Galois connections (e.g., the 0-CFA
analysis derived by Midtgaard and Jensen [118]). Existing formalisms are also tied to
the notion of abstraction by partitioning [51]: the control-flow abstraction partitions the
set of states into equivalence relations, the abstract values of which are merged.
Our formalisms follow this general approach (tracing and partitioning). However,
prior work starts from a subset of known control-flow approximations (e.g, context-
sensitivity [102,123,132], 0-CFA [118], or various forms of k-limiting and store value-
based approximations [112,125]) and seeks to formalize and prove sound those specific
control-flow approximations for a given analysis. In addition, most prior work calcu-
lates a series of Galois connections that leads to a specific (family of) control-flow
sensitivity. In contrast, our work provides a more general view that specifies a superset
of the control-flow sensitivities specified by prior work and exposes the possibility of
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many new control-flow sensitivities, while simplifying the required formalisms and en-
abling a practical implementation based directly on our formalisms. As such, our work
has similar goals to Might and Manolios’ a posteriori approach to soundness, which
separates many aspects of the precision of an analysis from its soundness [119]; how-
ever, our technique relies on a novel insight that connects widening and control-flow
sensitivity.
Contributions. This chapter makes the following contributions:
A new formulation of control-flow sensitivity as a widening operator, which gener-
alizes and modularizes existing formulations based on abstraction by partitioning. This
formulation leads to a method for designing and implementing a program analysis so
that control-flow sensitivity is a separate and independent component. The chapter de-
scribes several requirements on the form a semantics should take to enable separable
control-flow sensitivity. Individually these observations are not novel; in fact, they may
be well-known to the community. When collectively combined, however, they form an
analysis design that permits sound, tunable control-flow approximation via widening.
(Section 2.2)
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2.2 Separating Control-Flow Sensitivity from an Anal-
ysis
In this section, we describe how to use widening to separate control-flow sensitivity
from the rest of the analysis and make it an independent concern. We first establish our
starting point: an abstract semantics that defines an analysis with no notion of sensitiv-
ity. We then describe a parameterized widening operator for the analysis and show how
different instantiations of the parameter yield different control-flow sensitivities. Fi-
nally, we discuss some requirements on the form of semantics used by the analysis that
make it amenable to describing control-flow sensitivity. The discussion in this section
leaves the exact language and semantics being analyzed unspecified.
2.2.1 Starting Point
This subsection provides background and context on program analysis, giving us a
starting point for our design. Nothing in this subsection is novel, the material is adapted
from existing work [49]. For concreteness, we assume that the abstract semantics is
described as a state transition system, e.g., a small-step abstract machine semantics;
Section 2.2.4 will discuss more general requirements on the form of the semantics.
The abstract semantics is formally described as a set of states ςˆ ∈ Σ] and a transition
relation between states F ] ⊆ Σ] × Σ]. The semantics uses a transition relation instead
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of a function to account for nondeterminism in the analysis due to uncertain control-
flow (e.g., when a conditional guard’s truth value is indeterminate, and so the analysis
must take both branches). The set of states forms a lattice L] = (Σ],v,u,unionsq). We leave
the definition of states and the transition relation unspecified, but we assume that any
abstract domains used in the states are equipped with a widening operator.1
The program analysis is defined as the set of all reachable states starting from some
set of initial states and iteratively applying the transition relation. This definition is
formalized as a least fixpoint computation. Let F˚ ](S ) def== S ∪ F ](S ), i.e., a relation
that is lifted to remember every state visited by the transition relation F ]. The analysis
of a program P is defined as JPK] def== lfpΣ]I F˚ ], i.e., the least fixpoint of F˚ ] starting
from an initial set of states Σ]I derived from P .
The analysis JPK] is intractable, because the set of reachable states is either infinite
or, at the least, exponential in the number of nondeterministic transitions made during
the fixpoint computation. The issue is control-flow—specifically, the nondeterministic
choices that must be made by the analysis: which branch of a conditional should be
taken, whether a loop should be entered or exited, which (indirect) function should be
called, etc. The analysis designer at this point must either (1) bake into the abstract
semantics a specific strategy for dealing with control-flow; or (2) ignore the issue in the
formalized analysis design and use an ad-hoc strategy in the analysis implementation.
1If the domain is a noetherian lattice then the lattice join operator is a widening operator.
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Our proposed widening operator is a means to formalize control-flow sensitivity in
a manner that guarantees soundness, but does not require that a sensitivity to be baked
into the semantics. On a practical level, it also allows the analysis designer to experi-
ment with many different sensitivities without modifying the analysis implementation.
2.2.2 Widening Operator
Our goal is to limit the number of states contained in the fixpoint, while still retain-
ing soundness. We do so by defining a widening operator for the fixpoint computation,
which acts on entire sets of states rather than on individual abstract domains inside
the states. This widening operator: (1) partitions the current set of reachable states
into disjoint sets; (2) merges all of the states in each partition into a single state that
over-approximates that partition; and (3) unions the resulting states together into a new
set that contains only a single state per partition. The widening operator controls the
performance and precision of the analysis by setting a bound on the number of states
allowed: there can be at most one state per partition. Decreasing the number of par-
titions can speed up the fixpoint computation, thus helping performance, but can also
merge more states together in each partition, thus hindering precision.
Formally, the widening operator for control-flow sensitivity is parameterized by a
(unspecified) equivalence relation ∼ on abstract states. Given a widening operator O
on individual abstract domains, our new widening operator O] is defined as:
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O] ∈ P(Σ])× P(Σ])→ P(Σ])
A O] B =
{
∇ςˆ∈X ςˆ
∣∣∣∣ X ∈ (A ∪B)/∼ }
where for a set S the notation S/∼ means the set of partitions of S according to equiv-
alence relation ∼, and the widening operator O on individual abstract domains is used
to merge the states in each resulting partition into a single state. Note that if the number
of partitions induced by ∼ is finite, then the number of states in each partition is also
finite because we apply the widening operator at each step of the fixpoint computation.
Theorem 2.2.1 (WIDENING). If the number of partitions induced by ∼ is finite, then
O] is a widening operator.
Proof. Follows from the definition of a widening operator [50].
We now lift the transition relation F ] in a similar fashion as before, except instead
of using set union we use our widening operator:
OF ](S ) def== S O] F ](S ). Then the
control-flow sensitive abstract semantics is defined as JPK]O def== lfpΣ]I OF ].
Even though we have not specified the equivalence relation that parameterizes the
widening operator, we can still prove the soundness of the analysis. Informally, because
the widening operator merges the states within each partition using O , the reachable
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states using
OF ] over-approximate the reachable states using F˚ ]. Thus, the control-flow
sensitive abstract semantics is sound with respect to the original abstract semantics:
Theorem 2.2.2 (SOUNDNESS).
γ(JPK]) ⊆ γ(JPK]O )
Proof. We must show that (1) the least fixpoint denoted by JPK]O exists; and (2) it
over-approximates JPK].
1. The existence of the fixpoint follows from part 2 of the definition of a widening
operator as given by Cousot and Cousot [50, def. 9.1.3.3].
2. That the widened fixpoint over-approximates the original fixpoint follows from
part 1 of the definition of a widening operator as given by Cousot and Cousot [50,
defs. 9.1.3.1–9.1.3.2].
2.2.3 Control-Flow Sensitivity
It remains to show how our widening operator determines the control-flow sensi-
tivity of the analysis. The determining factor is how the states are partitioned, which
is controlled by the specific equivalence relation on states ∼ that parameterizes the
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widening operator. The question is, what constitutes a good choice for the equivalence
relation? For Theorem 2.2.1 to hold, it must induce a finite number of partitions, but
what other characteristics should it have? Our goal is tractability with a minimal loss
of precision; this means we should try to partition the states so that there are a tractable
number of partitions and the states within each partition are as similar to each other as
possible (to minimize the information lost to merging).
A reasonable heuristic is to partition states based on how those states were com-
puted, i.e., the execution history that led to each particular state. The hypothesis is that
if two states were derived in a similar way then they are more likely to be similar. This
heuristic of similarity is exactly the one used by existing control-flow sensitivities, such
as flow-sensitive maximal fixpoint, k-CFA, object-sensitivity, property simulation, etc.
These sensitivities each compute an abstraction of the execution history (e.g., current
program point, last k call-sites, last k allocation sites, etc.) and use that abstraction to
partition and merge the states during the analysis.
Therefore, the widening operator should partition the set of states according to their
control-flow sensitivity approximation:
ςˆ1 ∼ ςˆ2 ⇐⇒ piτˆ (ςˆ2) = piτˆ (ςˆ2)
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where each state contains an abstract trace τˆ describing some abstraction of the ex-
ecution history, and piτˆ (ςˆ) projects a state’s abstract trace. This definition causes the
widening operator to merge all states with the same trace, i.e., all states with the same
approximate execution history. The widened analysis can be defined without specifying
a particular abstract trace domain; different trace domains can be plugged in after the
fact to yield different sensitivities.
Trace Abstractions. We have posited that control-flow sensitivity is based on an ab-
straction of the execution history of a program, called a trace. This implies that the trace
abstraction is related to the trace-based concrete collecting semantics, which contains
all reachable execution paths, i.e., sequences of states, rather than just all reachable
states. An abstract trace is an abstraction of a set of paths in the concrete collecting
semantics. For example, a flow-sensitive trace abstraction records the current program
point, abstracting all paths that reach that program point. A context-sensitive trace ab-
straction additionally records the invocation context of the current function, abstracting
all paths that end in that particular invocation context (e.g., as in Nielson and Nielson’s
mementoes [123]). Different forms of context-sensitivity define the abstract “context”
differently: for example, traditional k-CFA defines it as the last k call-sites encoun-
tered in the concrete trace; stack-based k-CFA considers the top k currently active (i.e.,
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not yet returned) calls on the stack; object sensitivity considers abstract allocation sites
instead of call-sites; and so on.
We note that it is not necessary for the trace abstraction to soundly approximate
the concrete semantics for the resulting analysis to be sound. The trace abstraction is
a heuristic for partitioning the states; as long as the number of elements in the trace
abstraction domain is finite (and hence the number of partitions enforced by the widen-
ing operator is finite), the analysis will terminate with a sound solution. In fact, it isn’t
strictly necessary for ∼ to be based on control-flow at all—exploring other heuristics
for partitioning states would be in interesting avenue for future work.
2.2.4 Semantic Requirements
To benefit from widening-based control-flow sensitivity, an abstract semantics must
satisfy certain requirements. To abstract control, the analysis must be able to introduce
new program execution paths that over-approximate existing execution paths. To make
this possible, we argue that there should be some explicit notion in the program seman-
tics of the “rest of the computation”—i.e., a continuation. When the analysis abstracts
control, it is abstracting these continuations. The explicit control-flow representation
can take a number of possible forms. For example, it could be in the form of a syn-
tactic continuation (e.g., if a program is in continuation-passing style then the “rest of
the computation” is given as a closure in the store) or a semantic continuation (e.g.,
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the continuation stack of an abstract machine). Since the abstract states form a lattice,
any two distinct states must have a join, and (according to our requirement) this joined
state must contain a continuation that over-approximates the input states’ continuations.
Thus, by joining states the analysis approximates control as well as data.
Some forms of semantics do not meet this requirement, including various forms
proposed as being good foundations for abstract interpretation [115, 129, 130]. For ex-
ample, big-step and small-step structural operational semantics implicitly embed the
continuations in the semantic rules. Direct-style denotational semantics similarly em-
beds this information in the translation to the underlying meta-language. This means
that there is no way to abstract and over-approximate control-flow; the analysis must
use whatever control-flow the original semantics specifies (or, alternatively, use ad-hoc
strategies baked into the analysis implementation to silently handle control-flow sen-
sitivity). Some limited forms of control-flow sensitivity may still be expressed when
the analysis takes care to join only those states that already have the same continua-
tion (e.g., flow-sensitive maximal fixpoint), but many other forms (e.g., k-CFA or other
forms of context-[in]sensitivity) remain difficult to express.
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2.3 Related Work
In abstract interpretation, there is a relatively small but dedicated body of research
on trace abstraction and on formalizing control-flow sensitivity as partitioning. What
distinguishes our work from most prior efforts is a different focus: prior work focuses
on the integration of control-flow abstractions into an existing analysis; our work fo-
cuses on the separation of control-flow abstractions from an existing analysis, so that
it is easier for analysis designers to experiment with different control-flow sensitivities.
In this section, we discuss the implications of these differences. Broadly, no prior work
has couched control-flow sensitivity in terms of a widening operator based on abstrac-
tions of the program history, which permits a simpler, more general, and more tunable
formulation of control-flow sensitivity.
A Posteriori Soundness. Our work is most similar to Might and Manolios’ a pos-
teriori soundness for non-deterministic abstract interpretation [119], which also seeks
to separate the aspects of an analysis that affect its precision from those that affect
its soundness. Both techniques achieve this separation by introducing a level of in-
direction, although the mechanisms are different. Our technique uses an equivalence
relation that partitions abstract states. Might and Manolios’ uses an abstract alloca-
tion policy that can dynamically allocate the resources that determine how to partition
abstract states. We accomplish soundness by leveraging the soundness of widening.
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Might and Manolios accomplish soundness via their technique of an a posteriori proof:
their abstract allocation policies induce a non-deterministic abstract semantics that can
be shown to produce sound analysis results, even though the abstract semantics do
not conform to the traditional simulation of the concrete semantics. Our work also
re-formulates one of Might and Manolios’ insights: that most control-flow (or heap-
allocation) approximations are already sound because they add only extra information
to the analysis. A particular strength of Might and Manolios’ work is that it makes it
easy to express sound, adaptable analyses. A particular strength of our work is that it
makes it easy to declaratively describe many forms of analyses and to systematically
combine them. It is not clear whether the two techniques are equally expressive, nor
whether they are equally useful in practice. An interesting line of research would be
to explore how well each technique is suited to the practical discovery, design, and im-
plementation of precise analyses and how the two techniques might compete with or
complement each other.
Trace Partitioning. Our work is similar in some respects to the trace partitioning
work by Mauborgne and Rival [112, 125], which itself builds on the abstraction-by-
partitioning of control-flow by Handjieva and Tzolovski [81]. Trace partitioning
was developed in the context of the ASTRE´E static analyzer [52] for a restricted subset
of the C language, primarily intended for embedded systems. Mauborgne and Rival
22
Chapter 2. Constructing Configurable and Sound Abstract Interpreters via Widening
for Control-Flow
observe that usually abstract interpreters are (1) based on reachable states collecting
semantics, making it difficult to express control-flow sensitivity; and (2) designed to
silently merge information at control-flow join points2—what in dataflow analysis is
called “flow-sensitive maximal fixpoint” [92]. They propose a method to postpone
these silent merges when doing so can increase precision; effectively they add a con-
trolled form of path-sensitivity. They formalize their technique as a series of Galois
connections.
Mauborgne and Rival describe a denotational semantics-based analysis that can use
three criteria to determine whether to merge information at a particular point: the last k
branch decisions taken (i.e., whether an execution path took the true or false branch);
the last k while-loop iterations (effectively unrolling the loop k times); and the value
of some distinguished variable. These criteria are guided by syntactic hints inserted
into a program prior to analysis; the analysis itself can choose to ignore these hints and
merge information regardless, as a form of widening. This feature is a form of dynamic
partitioning, where the choice of partition is made as the analysis executes. Our sum
abstraction (Section ??) is another form of dynamic partitioning.
The analysis described by Mauborgne and Rival requires that the program is non-
recursive; it fully inlines all procedure calls to attain complete context-sensitivity. Be-
cause the semantics they formulate does not contain an explicit representation of con-
2By which they mean that the abstract semantics say nothing about merging information, but the
implementation does so anyway.
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tinuations, there is no way in their described system to achieve other forms of context-
sensitivity (e.g., k-CFA, including 0-CFA, i.e., context-insensitive analysis) without
heavily modifying their design, implementation, and formalisms (cf. our discussion
in Section 2.2.4). Because our method seeks more generality, it can express all of the
sensitivities described by Mauborgne and Rival.
Predicate Abstraction. Fischer et al. [67] propose a method to join dataflow analy-
sis with predicate abstraction using predicate lattices to gain a form of tunable intra-
procedural path-sensitivity. At a high level these predicate lattices perform a similar
“partition and merge” strategy as our own method. However, our method is more gen-
eral: we can specify many more forms of control-flow sensitivity due to our insights
regarding explicit control state. One can consider their work as a specific instantiation
of our method using predicates as the trace abstraction. On the other hand, Fisher et al.
use predicate refinement to automatically determine the set of predicates to use, which
is outside the current scope of our method. In order to do the same, our method would
need to add a predicate refinement strategy.
Context Sensitivity. There are several papers that describe various abstract interpreta-
tion-based approaches to specific forms of context sensitivity, including Nielson and
Nielson [123], Ashley and Dybvig [36], Van Horn and Might [138], and Midtgaard and
Jensen [117, 118]. Nielson and Nielson describe a form of context-sensitivity based
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on abstractions of the history of a program’s calls and returns [123]. Although this
formulation is separable, it is not as general as the one described in this chapter. For
example, it cannot capture calls and returns in obfuscated binaries (which may contain
no explicit calls and returns); to capture such behavior, a different formulation similar
to property simulation is required [102]. Our parameterized, widening-based approach
we describe is general enough to capture either of these formulations (and many more).
Ashley and Dybvig [36] give a reachable states collecting semantics formulation
of k-CFA for a core Scheme-like language; they instrument both the concrete and ab-
stract semantics with a cache that collects CFA information. The analysis as described
in the paper is intractable (i.e., although it yields the same precision as k-CFA, the
number of states remains exponential in the size of the program). Ashley and Dybvig
implement a tractable, flow-insensitive version of the analysis independently from the
formally-derived version, rather than deriving the tractable version directly from the
formal semantics.
Van Horn and Might [138] also give a method for constructing analyses, using an
abstract machine-based, reachable states collecting semantics of the lambda calculus.
Their analysis includes a specification of k-CFA. An important contribution of their pa-
per is a technique to abstract the infinite domains used for environments and semantic
continuations using store allocation. As with Ashley and Dybvig, the analysis as de-
scribed in their paper does not directly yield a tractable analysis. Van Horn and Might
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describe a tractable version of their analysis (not formally derived from the language
semantics) that uses a single, global store to improve efficiency, but disallows flow-
sensitive analysis because it computes a single solution for the entire program.
Midtgaard and Jensen [117] derive a tractable, demand-driven 0-CFA analysis for
a core Scheme-like language using abstract interpretation. Their technique specifically
targets 0-CFA, rather than general k-CFA. They employ a series of abstractions via Ga-
lois connections, the composition of which leads to the final 0-CFA analysis. In a later
paper, Midtgaard and Jensen derive another 0-CFA analysis to compute both call and
return information [118]. We illustrate how to achieve a sound analysis with arbitrary
control-flow sensitivity, without having to derive the soundness for each sensitivity.
2.4 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a method for program analysis design and implementation that
allows the analysis designer to parameterize over control-flow abstractions. This sepa-
ration of concerns springs from a novel theoretical insight that control-flow sensitivity
is induced by a widening operator parameterized by trace abstractions. Our method
makes it easier for an analysis designer to specify, implement, and experiment with
many forms of control-flow sensitivity, which is critical for developing new, practical
analyses. Our future work involves exploring these ideas further, for example, using
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combinatorial optimization to explore the vast space of possible trace abstractions. Ad-
ditionally, our method applies not only to control-flow but to any property of a program
that can be abstracted and that might be useful to partition the analysis state-space.
Ultimately, the goal of our work is to raise the level of abstraction for analysis
designers so that we spend less time specifying and implementing new ideas, and more
time formulating and evaluating them.
27
Chapter 3
JSAI: The JavaScript Abstract
Interpreter
3.1 Introduction
JavaScript is pervasive. While it began as a client-side webpage scripting language,
JavaScript has grown hugely in scope and popularity and is used to extend the func-
tionality of web browsers via browser addons, to develop desktop applications (e.g., for
Windows 8 [3]) and server-side applications (e.g., using Node.js [4]), and to develop
mobile phone applications (e.g., for Firefox OS [5]). JavaScript’s growing prominence
means that secure, correct, maintainable, and fast JavaScript code is becoming ever
more critical. Static analysis traditionally plays a large role in providing these charac-
teristics: it can be used for security auditing, error-checking, debugging, optimization,
program understanding, refactoring, and more. However, JavaScript’s inherently dy-
namic nature and many unintuitive quirks cause great difficulty for static analysis.
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Our goal is to overcome these difficulties and provide a formally specified, well-
tested static analysis platform for JavaScript, immediately useful for many client anal-
yses such as those listed above. In fact, we have used JSAI in previous work to build
a security auditing tool for browser addons [96] and to experiment with strategies to
improve analysis precision [97]. We have also used JSAI to build a static program slic-
ing [141] client and to build a novel abstract slicing [143] client. These are only a few
examples of JSAI’s usefulness.
Several important characteristics distinguish JSAI from existing JavaScript static
analyses (which are discussed further in Section 6.7):
• JSAI is formally specified. We base our analysis on formally specified concrete
and abstract JavaScript semantics. The two semantics are connected using ab-
stract interpretation; we have soundness proof sketches for our most novel and
interesting abstract analysis domain. JSAI handles JavaScript as specified by the
ECMA 3 standard [62] (sans eval and family), and various language extensions
such as Typed Arrays [6].
• JSAI’s concrete semantics have been extensively tested against an existing com-
mercial JavaScript engine, and the JSAI abstract semantics have been extensively
tested against the concrete semantics for soundness.
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• JSAI’s analysis sensitivity (i.e., path-, context-, and heap-sensitivity) are user-
configurable independently from the rest of the analysis. This means that JSAI
allows arbitrary sensitivities as defined by the user rather than only allowing a
small set of baked-in choices, and that the sensitivity can be set independently
from the rest of the analysis or any client analyses.
JSAI’s contributions include complete formalisms for concrete and abstract seman-
tics for JavaScript along with implementations of concrete and abstract interpreters
based on these semantics. While concrete semantics for JavaScript have been proposed
before, ours is the first designed specifically for abstract interpretation. Our abstract
semantics is the first formal abstract semantics for JavaScript in the literature. The
abstract interpreter implementation is the first available static analyzer for JavaScript
that provides easy configurability as a design goal. All these contributions are available
freely for download as supplementary materials1. JSAI provides a solid foundation on
which to build multiple client analyses for JavaScript. The specific contributions of this
chapter are:
• The design of a JavaScript intermediate language and concrete semantics in-
tended specifically for abstract interpretation (Section 3.3.1).
• The design of an abstract semantics that enables configurable, sound abstract
interpretation for JavaScript (Section 3.3.2). This abstract semantics represents a
1http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/˜pllab, under Downloads.
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reduced product of type inference, pointer analysis, control-flow analysis, string
analysis, and number and boolean constant propagation.
• Novel abstract string and object domains for JavaScript analysis (Section 3.3.3).
• A discussion of JSAI’s configurable analysis sensitivity, including two novel con-
text sensitivities for JavaScript (Section 3.4).
• An evaluation of JSAI’s performance and precision on the most comprehensive
suite of benchmarks for JavaScript static analysis that we are aware of, includ-
ing browser addons, machine-generated programs via Emscripten [7], and open-
source JavaScript programs (Section 3.5). We showcase JSAI’s configurability
by evaluating a large number of context-sensitivities, and point out novel insights
from the results.
We preface these contributions with a discussion of related work (Section 6.7) and
conclude with plans for future work (Section 5.6).
3.2 Related Work
In this section we discuss existing static analyses and hybrid static/dynamic analy-
ses for JavaScript and discuss previous efforts to formally specify JavaScript semantics.
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JavaScript Analyses. The current state-of-the-art static analyses for JavaScript usually
take one of two approaches: (1) an unsound2 dataflow analysis-based approach using
baked-in abstractions and analysis sensitivities [41, 75, 85], or (2) a formally-specified
type system requiring annotations to existing code, proven sound with respect to a spe-
cific JavaScript formal semantics but restricted to a small subset of the full JavaScript
language [46, 77, 84, 135]. No existing JavaScript analyses are formally specified, im-
plemented using an executable abstract semantics, tested against a formal concrete se-
mantics, or target configurable sensitivity.
The closest related work to JSAI is the JavaScript static analyzer TAJS by Jensen et
al [87, 89, 90]. While TAJS is intended to be a sound analysis of the entire JavaScript
language (sans dynamic code injection), it does not possess any of the characteristics
of JSAI described in Section 6.1. The TAJS analysis is not formally specified and the
TAJS papers have insufficient information to reproduce the analysis; also the analysis
implementation is not well documented, making it difficult to build client analyses
or modify the main TAJS analysis. In the process of formally specifying JSAI, we
uncovered several previously unknown soundness bugs in TAJS that were confirmed
by the TAJS authors. This serves to highlight the importance and usefulness of formal
specification.
2Most examples of this approach are intentionally unsound as a design decision, in order to handle the
many difficulties raised by JavaScript analysis. Unsound analysis can be useful in some circumstances,
but for many purposes (e.g., security auditing) soundness is a key requirement.
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Various previous works [34, 70, 72, 85, 109, 134, 135] propose different subsets of
the JavaScript language and provide analyses for that subset. These analyses range
from type inference, to pointer analysis, to numeric range and kind analysis. None of
these handle the full complexities of JavaScript. Several intentionally unsound analy-
ses [8,41,65,110,139] have been proposed, while other works [75,85] take a best-effort
approach to soundness, without any assurance that the analysis is actually sound. None
of these efforts attempt to formally specify the analysis they implement.
Several type systems [46, 77, 84, 135] have been proposed to retrofit JavaScript (or
subsets thereof) with static types. Guha et. al. [77] propose a novel combination of
type systems and flow analysis. Chugh et. al. [46] propose a flow-sensitive refinement
type system designed to allow typing of common JavaScript idioms. These type sys-
tems require programmer annotations and cannot be used as-is on real-world JavaScript
programs.
Combinations of static analysis with dynamic checks [47, 72] have also been pro-
posed. These systems statically analyze a subset of JavaScript under certain assump-
tions and use runtime checks to enforce these assumptions. Scha¨fer et al. [128] use a
dynamic analysis to determine information that can be leveraged to scale static analysis
for JavaScript. These ideas are complementary to and can supplement our purely static
techniques.
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JavaScript Formalisms. None of the previous work on static analysis of JavaScript
have formally specified the analysis. However, there has been previous work on provid-
ing JavaScript with a formal concrete semantics. Maffeis et. al [111] give a structural
smallstep operational semantics directly to the full JavaScript language (omitting a few
constructs). Lee et. al [104] propose SAFE, a semantic framework that provides struc-
tural bigstep operational semantics to JavaScript, based directly on the ECMAScript
specification. Due to their size and complexity, neither of these semantic formulations
are suitable for direct translation into an abstract interpreter.
Guha et. al [76] propose a core calculus approach to provide semantics to JavaScript—
they provide a desugarer from JavaScript to a core calculus called λJS , which has a
smallstep structural operational semantics. Their intention was to provide a minimal
core calculus that would ease proving soundness for type systems, thus placing all the
complexity in the desugarer. However, their core calculus is too low-level to perform a
precise and scalable static analysis (for example, some of the semantic structure that is
critical for a precise analysis is lost, and their desugaring causes a large code bloat—
more than 200× on average). We also use the core calculus approach; however, our
own intermediate language, called notJS, is designed to be in a sweet-spot that favors
static analysis (for example, the code bloat due to our translation is between 6 − 8×
on average). In addition, we use an abstract machine-based semantics rather than a
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structural semantics, which (as described later) is the prime enabler for configurable
analysis sensitivity.
Configurable Sensitivity. Bravenboer and Smaragdakis introduce the DOOP frame-
work [45] that performs flow-insensitive points-to analysis for Java programs using a
declarative specification in Datalog. Several context-sensitive versions [98, 132] of the
points-to analysis are expressible in this framework as modular variations of a common
code base. Their framework would require significant changes to enable flow-sensitive
analysis (especially for a language like JavaScript, which requires an extensive analysis
to compute a sound SSA form) like ours, and they cannot express arbitrary analysis
sensitivities (including path sensitivities) modularly the way that JSAI can.
3.3 JSAI Design
We break our discussion of the JSAI design into three main components: (1) the
design of an intermediate representation (IR) for JavaScript programs, called notJS,
along with its concrete semantics; (2) the design of an abstract semantics for notJS that
yields the reduced product of a number of essential sub-analyses and also enables con-
figurable analysis; and (3) the design of novel abstract domains for JavaScript analysis.
We conclude with a discussion of various options for handling dynamic code injection.
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The intent of this section is to discuss the design decisions that went into JSAI,
rather than giving a comprehensive description of the various formalisms (e.g., the
translation from JavaScript to notJS, the concrete semantics of notJS, and the abstract
semantics of notJS). All of these formalisms, along with their implementations, are
available in the supplementary materials.
3.3.1 Designing the notJS IR
JavaScript’s many idiosyncrasies and quirky behaviors motivate the use of formal
specifications for both the concrete JavaScript semantics and our abstract analysis se-
mantics. Our approach is to define an intermediate language called notJS, along with
a formally-specified translation from JavaScript to notJS. We then give notJS a formal
concrete semantics upon which we base our abstract interpreter.3
Figure 3.3.1 shows the abstract syntax of notJS, which was carefully designed with
the ultimate goal of making abstract interpretation simple, precise, and efficient. The IR
contains literal expressions for numeric, boolean values and for undef and null. Object
values are expressed with the new construct, and function values are expressed with the
newfun construct. The IR directly supports exceptions via throw and try-catch-fin; it
supports other non-local control flow (e.g., JavaScript’s return, break, and continue)
via the jump construct. The IR supports two forms of loops: while and for. The
3Guha et al [76] use a similar approach, but our IR design and formal semantics are quite different.
See Section 6.7 for a discussion of the differences between our two approaches.
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for construct corresponds to JavaScript’s reflective for..in statement, which allows
the programmer to iterate over the fields of an object. A method takes exactly two
arguments: self and args, referring to the this object and arguments object; all
variants of JavaScript method calls can be translated to this form. The toobj, tobool,
tostr, tonum and isprim constructs are the explicit analogues of JavaScript’s implicit
conversions. JavaScript’s builtin objects (e.g,. Math) and methods (e.g., isNaN) are
properties of the global object that is constructed prior to a program’s execution, thus
they are not a part of the IR syntax.
Note that our intermediate language is not based on a control-flow graph but rather
on an abstract syntax tree (AST), further distinguishing it from existing JavaScript anal-
yses. JavaScript’s higher-order functions, implicit exceptions, and implicit type con-
versions (that can execute arbitrary user-defined code) make a program’s control-flow
extremely difficult to precisely characterize without extensive analysis of the very kind
we are using the intermediate language to carry out. Other JavaScript analyses that do
use a flow-graph approach start by approximating the control-flow and then fill in more
control-flow information in an ad-hoc manner as the analysis progresses; this leads to
both imprecision and unsoundness (for example, one of the soundness bugs we discov-
ered in TAJS was directly due to this issue). JSAI uses the smallstep abstract machine
semantics to determine control-flow during the analysis itself in a sound manner.
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n ∈ Num b ∈ Bool str ∈ String x ∈ Variable ` ∈ Label
s ∈ Stmt ::= ~si | if e s1 s2 | while e s | x := e
| e1.e2 := e3 | x := e1(e2, e3) | x := toobj e
| x := del e1.e2 | x := newfun m n
| x := new e1(e2) | for x e s | throw e
| try-catch-fin s1 x s2 s3 | ` s | jump ` e
e ∈ Exp ::= n | b | str | undef | null
| x |m | e1 ⊕ e2 | e
d ∈ Decl ::= decl −−−−→xi = ei in s
m ∈ Meth ::= (self, args)⇒ d | (self, args)⇒ s
⊕ ∈ BinOp ::= + | − | × | ÷ | % | << | >> | >>> | <
| ≤ | & | ′|′ | Y | and | or | ++ | ≺ | 
| ≈ | ≡ | . | instanceof | in
 ∈ UnOp ::= − | ∼ | ¬ | typeof | isprim | tobool
| tostr | tonum
Figure 3.1: The abstract syntax of notJS provides canonical constructs that simplify
JavaScript’s behavior. The vector notation represents (by abuse of notation) an ordered
sequence of unspecified length n, where i ranges from 0 to n− 1.
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An important design decision we made is to carefully separate the language into
pure expressions (e ∈ Exp) that are guaranteed to terminate without throwing an excep-
tion, and impure statements (s ∈ Stmt) that do not have these guarantees. This decision
directly impacts the formal semantics and implementation of notJS by reducing the size
of the formal semantics4 and the corresponding code to one-third of the previous size
compared to a version without this separation, and vastly simplifying them. This is
the first IR for JavaScript we are aware of that makes this design choice—it is a more
radical choice than might first be apparent, because JavaScript’s implicit conversions
make it difficult to enforce this separation without careful thought. Other design deci-
sions of note include making JavaScript’s implicit conversions (which are complex and
difficult to reason about, involving multiple steps and alternatives depending on the cur-
rent state of the program) explicit in notJS (the constructs toobj, isprim, tobool, tostr,
tonum are used for this); leaving certain JavaScript constructs unlowered to allow for
a more precise abstract semantics (e.g., the for..in loop, which we leave mostly intact
as for x e s); and simplifying method calls to make the implicit this parameter and
arguments object explicit; this is often, but not always, the address of a method’s
receiver object, and its value can be non-intuitive, while arguments provides a form
of reflection providing access to a method’s arguments.
4Specifically, the number of semantic continuations and transition rules.
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Given the notJS abstract syntax, we need to design a formal concrete semantics
that (together with the translation to notJS) captures JavaScript behavior. We have
two main criteria: (1) the semantics should be specified in a manner that can be di-
rectly converted into an implementation, allowing us to test its behavior against actual
JavaScript implementations; (2) looking ahead to the abstract version of the semantics
(which defines our analysis), the semantics should be specified in a manner that allows
for configurable sensitivity. These requirements lead us to specify the notJS semantics
as an abstract machine-based smallstep operational semantics. One can think of this
semantics as an infinite state transition system, wherein we formally define a notion of
state and a set of transition rules that connect states. The semantics is implemented
by turning the state definition into a data structure (e.g., a Scala class) and the transi-
tion rules into functions that transform a given state into the next state. The concrete
interpreter starts with an initial state (containing the start of the program and all of the
builtin JavaScript methods and objects), and continually computes the next state until
the program finishes.
We omit further details of the concrete semantics for space and because they have
much in common with the abstract semantics described in the next section. The main
difference between the two is that the abstract state employs sets in places where the
concrete state employs singletons, and the abstract transition rules are nondeterministic
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whereas the concrete rules are deterministic. Both of these differences are because the
abstract semantics over-approximates the concrete semantics.
Testing the Semantics. We tested the translation to notJS, the notJS semantics, and im-
plementations thereof by comparing the resulting program execution behavior with that
of a commercial JavaScript engine, SpiderMonkey [9]. We first manually constructed
a test suite of over 243 programs that were either hand-crafted to exercise various parts
of the semantics, or taken from existing JavaScript programs used to test commer-
cial JavaScript implementations. We then added over one million randomly generated
JavaScript programs to the test suite. We ran all of the programs in the test suite on Spi-
derMonkey and on our concrete interpreter, and we verified that they produce identical
output. Because the ECMA specification is informal we can never completely guaran-
tee that the notJS semantics is equivalent to the spec, but we can do as well as other
JavaScript implementations, which also use testing to establish conformance with the
ECMA specification.
3.3.2 Designing the Abstract Semantics
The JavaScript static analysis is defined as an abstract semantics for notJS that over-
approximates the notJS concrete semantics. The analysis is implemented by computing
the set of all abstract states reachable from a given initial state by following the abstract
transition rules. The analysis contains some special machinery that provides config-
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urable sensitivity. We illustrate our approach via a worklist algorithm that ties these
concepts together:
Algorithm 1 The JSAI worklist algorithm
1: put the initial abstract state ςˆ0 on the worklist
2: initialize map partition : Trace → State] to empty
3: repeat
4: remove an abstract state ςˆ from the worklist
5: for all abstract states ςˆ ′ in next states(ςˆ) do
6: if partition does not contain trace(ςˆ ′) then
7: partition(trace(ςˆ ′)) = ςˆ ′
8: put ςˆ ′ on worklist
9: else
10: ςˆold = partition(trace(ςˆ ′))
11: ςˆnew = ςˆold unionsq ςˆ ′
12: if ςˆnew 6= ςˆold then
13: partition(trace(ςˆ ′)) = ςˆnew
14: put ςˆnew on worklist
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
18: until worklist is empty
The static analysis performed by this worklist algorithm is determined by the defini-
tions of the abstract semantic states ςˆ ∈ State], the abstract transition rules5 next states ∈
State] → P(State]), and the knob that configures the analysis sensitivity trace(ςˆ).
Abstract Semantic Domains. Figure 3.2 shows our definition of an abstract state for
notJS. An abstract state ςˆ consists of a term that is either a notJS statement or an abstract
value that is the result of evaluating a statement; an environment that maps variables to
(sets of) addresses; a store mapping addresses to either abstract values, abstract ob-
5Omitted for space; available in supplementary materials.
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jects, or sets of continuations (to enforce computability for abstract semantics that use
semantic continuations, as per Van Horn and Might [138]); and finally a continuation
stack that represents the remaining computations to perform—one can think of this
component as analogous to a runtime stack that remembers computations that should
completed once the current computation is finished.
Abstract values are either exception/jump values (EValue], JValue]), used to han-
dle non-local control-flow, or base values (BValue]), used to represent JavaScript val-
ues. Base values are a tuple of abstract numbers, booleans, strings, addresses, null,
and undefined; each of these components is a lattice. Base values are defined as tu-
ples because the analysis over-approximates the concrete semantics, and thus cannot
constrain values to be only a single type at a time. These value tuples yield a type infer-
ence analysis: any component of this tuple that is a lattice ⊥ represents a type that this
value cannot contain. Base values do not include function closures, because functions
in JavaScript are actually objects. Instead, we define a class of abstract objects that
correspond to functions and that contain a set of closures that are used when that object
is called as a function. We describe our novel abstract object domain in more detail in
Section 3.3.3.
Each component of the tuple also represents an individual analysis: the abstract
number domain determines a number analysis, the abstract string domain determines a
string analysis, the abstract addresses domain determines a pointer analysis, etc. Com-
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nˆ ∈ Num] ŝtr ∈ String ] aˆ ∈ Address] ˆ ∈ UnOp] ⊕ˆ ∈ BinOp]
ςˆ ∈ State] = Term] × Env ] × Store] ×Kont ]
tˆ ∈ Term] = Decl + Stmt + Value]
ρˆ ∈ Env ] = Variable → P(Address ])
σˆ ∈ Store] = Address] → (BValue] + Object ] + P(Kont ]))
b̂v ∈ BValue] = Num] × P(Bool)× String ] × P(Address])×
P({null})× P({undef})
oˆ ∈ Object ] = (String ] → BValue])× P(String)×
(String → (BValue] + Class + P(Closure])))
c ∈ Class = {function, array, string,boolean,number,date,
error, regexp, arguments,object, . . .}
ĉlo ∈ Closure] = Env ] ×Meth
êv ∈ EValue] ::= exc bv
ĵv ∈ JValue] ::= jmp ` b̂v
vˆ ∈ Value] = BValue] + EValue] + JValue]
κˆ ∈ Kont ] ::= ĥaltK | ŝeqK ~si κˆ | ŵhileK e s κˆ | l̂blK ` κˆ
| f̂orK
−→̂
str i x s κˆ | r̂etK x ρˆ κˆ ctor
| r̂etK x ρˆ κˆ call | t̂ryK x s s κˆ | ĉatchK s κˆ
| finK vˆ κˆ | âddrK aˆ
Figure 3.2: Abstract semantic domains for notJS.
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posing the individual analyses represented by the components of the value tuple is not a
trivial task; a simple cartesian product of these domains (which corresponds to running
each analysis independently, without using information from the other analyses) would
be imprecise to the point of being useless. Instead, we specify a reduced product [50]
of the individual analyses, which means that we define the semantics so that each indi-
vidual domain can take advantage of the other domains’ information to improve their
results. The abstract number and string domains are intentionally unspecified in the se-
mantics; they are configurable. We discuss our specific implementations of the abstract
string domain in Section 3.3.3.
Together, all of these abstract domains define a set of simultaneous analyses: control-
flow analysis (for each call-site, which methods may be called), pointer analysis (for
each object reference, which objects may be accessed), type inference (for each value,
can it be a number, a boolean, a string, null, undef, or a particular class of object),
and extended versions of boolean, number, and string constant propagation (for each
boolean, number and string value, is it a known constant value). These analyses com-
bine to give detailed control- and data-flow information forming a fundamental analysis
that can be used by many possible clients (e.g., error detection, program slicing, secure
information flow, etc).
Abstract Transition Rules. Figure 3.3 describes a small subset of the abstract transi-
tion rules to give their flavor. To compute next states(ςˆ), the components of ςˆ are
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matched against the premises of the rules to find which rule(s) are relevant; that rule
then describes the next state (if multiple rules apply, then there will be multiple next
states). The rules 1, 2 and 3 deal with sequences of statements. Rule 1 says that if the
state’s term is a sequence, then pick the first statement in the sequence to be the next
state’s term; then take the rest of the sequence and put it in a seqK continuation for the
next state, pushing it on top of the continuation stack. Rule 2 says that if the state’s term
is a base value (and hence we have completed the evaluation of a statement), take the
next statement from the seqK continuation and make it the term for the next state. Rule
3 says that if there are no more statements in the sequence, pop the seqK continuation
off of the continuation stack. The rules 4 and 5 deal with conditionals. Rule 4 says
that if the guard expression evaluates to an abstract value that over-approximates true,
make the true branch statement the term for the next state; rule 5 is similar except it
takes the false branch. Note that these rules are nondeterministic, in that the same state
can match both rules.
Configurable Sensitivity. To enable configurable sensitivity, we build on the insights
of Hardekopf et al [82]. We extend the abstract state to include an additional compo-
nent from a Trace abstract domain. The worklist algorithm uses the trace function to
map each abstract state to its trace, and joins together all reachable abstract states that
map to the same trace (see lines 10–11 of Algorithm 4). The definition of Trace is left
to the analysis designer; different definitions yield different sensitivities. For example,
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Current State ςˆ Next State ςˆ ′
1 〈s ::~si, ρˆ, σˆ, κˆ〉 〈s, ρˆ, σˆ, ŝeqK ~si κˆ〉
2 〈b̂v , ρˆ, σˆ, ŝeqK s ::~si κˆ〉 〈s, ρˆ, σˆ, ŝeqK ~si κˆ〉
3 〈b̂v , ρˆ, σˆ, ŝeqK  κˆ〉 〈b̂v , ρˆ, σˆ, κˆ〉
4 〈if e s1 s2, ρˆ, σˆ, κˆ〉 〈s1, ρˆ, σˆ, κˆ〉 if true ∈ pibˆ(JeK)
5 〈if e s1 s2, ρˆ, σˆ, κˆ〉 〈s2, ρˆ, σˆ, κˆ〉 if false ∈ pibˆ(JeK)
Figure 3.3: A small subset of the abstract semantics rules for JSAI. Each smallstep rule
describes a transition relation from one abstract state ς to the next state ςˆ ′. The phrase
pibˆ(JeK) means to evaluate expression e to an abstract base value, then project out its
boolean component.
suppose Trace is defined as the set of program points, and an individual state’s trace
is the current program point. Then our worklist algorithm computes a flow-sensitive,
context-insensitive analysis: all states at the same program point are joined together,
yielding one state per program point. Suppose we redefine Trace to be sequences of
program points, and an individual state’s trace to be the last k call-sites. Then our
worklist algorithm computes a flow-sensitive, k-CFA context-sensitive analysis. Arbi-
trary sensitivities (including path-sensitivity and property simulation) can be defined in
this manner solely by redefining Trace, without affecting the worklist algorithm or the
abstract transition rules. We explore a number of possibilities in Section 3.5.
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3.3.3 Novel Abstract Domains
JSAI allows configurable abstract number and string domains, but we also provide
default domains based on our experience with JavaScript analysis. We motivate and
describe our default abstract string domain here. We also describe our novel abstract
object domain, which is an integral part of the JSAI abstract semantics.
Abstract Strings. Our initial abstract string domain String ] was an extended string
constant domain. The elements were either constant strings, or strings that are definitely
numbers, or strings that are definitely not numbers, or> (a completely unknown string).
This string domain is similar to the one used by TAJS [89], and it is motivated by the
precision gained while analyzing arrays: arrays are just objects where array indices
are represented with numeric string properties such as "0", "1", etc, but they also
have non-numeric properties like "length". However, this initial string domain was
inadequate.
In particular, we discovered a need to express that a string is not contained within
a given hard-coded set of strings. Consider the property lookup x := obj[y], where
y is a variable that resolves to an unknown string. Because the string is unknown,
the analysis is forced to assign to x not only the lattice join of all values contained in
obj, but also the lattice join of all the values contained in all prototypes of obj, due
to the rules of prototype-based inheritance. Almost all object prototype chains termi-
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>
−∞ ∞ NaN · · · −1.5 · · · 1.5 · · ·
Real
⊥
Figure 3.4: Our default number abstract domain, further explained in Section 3.3.3.
nate in one of the builtin objects contained in the global object (Object.prototype,
Array.prototype, etc); these builtin objects contain the builtin values and methods.
Thus, all of these builtin values and methods are returned for any object property access
based on an unknown string, polluting the analysis. One possible way to mitigate this
problem is to use an expensive domain that can express arbitrary complements (i.e., ex-
press that a string is not contained in some arbitrary set of strings). Instead, we extend
the string domain to separate out special strings (valueOf, toString etc, fixed ahead
of time) from the rest; these special strings are drawn from property names of builtin
values and methods. We can thus express that a string has an unknown value that is not
one of the special values. This is a practical solution that improves precision at minimal
cost.
The new abstract string domain depicted in Figure 3.5 (that separates unknown
strings into numeric, non-numeric and special strings) was simple to implement due to
JSAI’s configurable architecture; it did not require changes to any other parts of the im-
plementation despite the pervasive use of strings in all aspects of JavaScript semantics.
49
Chapter 3. JSAI: The JavaScript Abstract Interpreter
>
SNotSpl SNotNum
SNum SNotNumNorSpl SSpl
"1" · · · "2" · · · "foo" "bar"· · · "valueOf"· · ·
⊥
Figure 3.5: Our default string abstract domain, further explained in Section 3.3.3.
Abstract Objects. We highlight the abstract domain Object ] given in Figure 3.2 as
a novel contribution. Previous JavaScript analyses model abstract objects as a tuple
containing (1) a map from property names to values; and (2) a list of definitely present
properties (necessary because property names are just strings, and objects can be mod-
ified using unknown strings as property names). However, according to the ECMA
standard objects can be of different classes, such as functions, arrays, dates, regexps,
etc. While these are all objects and share many similarities, there are semantic differ-
ences between objects of different classes. For example, the length property of array
objects has semantic significance: assigning a value to length can implicitly add or
delete properties to the array object, and certain values cannot be assigned to length
without raising a runtime exception. Non-array objects can also have a length field,
but assigning to that field will have no other effect. The object’s class dictates the se-
mantics of property enumerate, update, and delete operations on an object. Thus, the
analysis must track what classes an abstract object may belong to in order to accurately
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model these semantic differences. If abstract objects can belong to arbitrary sets of
classes, this tracking and modeling becomes complex, error-prone, and inefficient.
Our innovation is to add a map as the third component of abstract objects that con-
tains class-specific values. This component also records which class an abstract object
belongs to. Finally, the semantics is designed so that any given abstract object must
belong to exactly one class. This is enforced by assigning abstract addresses to objects
based not just on their static allocation site and context, but also on the constructor used
to create the object (which determines its class). The resulting abstract semantics is
much simpler, more efficient, and precise.
3.4 Showcasing Configurability
Analysis sensitivity (path-, context-, and heap-sensitivity) hsa a significant impact
on the usefulness and practicality of the analysis. The sensitivity represents a tradeoff
between precision and performance: the more sensitive the analysis is the more precise
it can be, but also the more costly it can be. The “sweet-spot” in this tradeoff varies
from analysis to analysis and from program to program. JSAI allows the user to easily
specify different sensitivities in a modular way, separately from the rest of the analysis.
A particularly important dimension of sensitivity is context-sensitivity: how the
(potentially infinite) possible method call instances are partitioned and merged into a
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finite number of abstract instances. The current state of the art for JavaScript static
analysis has explored only a few possible context-sensitivity strategies, all of which are
baked into the analysis and difficult to change, with no real basis for choosing these
over other possible strategies.
We take advantage of JSAI’s configurability to define and evaluate a much larger
selection of context-sensitivities than has ever been evaluated before in a single paper.
Because of JSAI’s design, specifying each sensitivity takes only 5–20 lines of code; pre-
vious analysis implementations would have to hard-code each sensitivity from scratch.
The JSAI analysis designer specifies a sensitivity by instantiating a particular instance
of Trace; all abstract states with the same trace will be merged together. For context-
sensitivity, we define Trace to include some notion of the calling context, so that states
in the same context are merged while states in different contexts are kept separate.
We implement six main context-sensitivity strategies, each parameterized in various
ways, yielding a total of 56 different forms of context-sensitivity. All of our sensitiv-
ities are flow-sensitive (JavaScript’s dynamic nature means that flow-insensitive anal-
yses tend to have terrible precision). We empirically evaluate all of these strategies in
Section 3.5; here we define the six main strategies. Four of the six strategies are known
in the literature, while two are novel to this work. The novel strategies are based on
two hypotheses about context definitions that might provide a good balance between
precision and performance. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that these hypothe-
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ses are false, i.e., they do not provide any substantial benefit. We include them here
not as examples of good sensitivities to use, but rather to demonstrate that JSAI makes
it easy to formulate and test hypotheses about analysis strategies—each novel strategy
took only 15–20 minutes to implement. The strategies we defined are as follows, where
the first four are known and the last two are novel:
Context-insensitive. All calls to a given method are merged. We define the context
component of Trace to be a unit value, so that all contexts are the same.
Stack-CFA. Contexts are distinguished by the list of call-sites on the call-stack. This
strategy is k-limited to ensure there are only a finite number of possible contexts. We
define the Trace component to contain the top k call-sites.
Acyclic-CFA. Contexts are distinguished the same as Stack-CFA, but instead of k-
limiting we collapse recursive call cycles. We define Trace to contain all call-sites on
the call-stack, except that cycles are collapsed.
Object-sensitive. Contexts are distinguished by a list of addresses corresponding to
the chain of receiver objects (corresponding to full-object-sensitivity in Smaragdakis
et al. [132]). We define Trace to contain this information (k-limited to ensure finite
contexts).
Signature-CFA. Type information is important for dynamically typed languages, so
intuitively it seems that type information would make good contexts. We hypothesize
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that defining Trace to record the types of a call’s arguments would be a good context-
sensitivity, so that all k-limited call paths with the same types of arguments would be
merged.
Mixed-CFA. Object-sensitivity uses the address of the receiver object. However, in
JavaScript the receiver object is often the global object created at the beginning of
the program execution. Intuitively, it seems this would mean that object sensitivity
might merge many calls that should be kept separate. We hypothesized that it might
be beneficial to define Trace as a modified object-sensitive strategy—when object-
sensitivity would use the address of the global object, this strategy uses the current
call-site instead.
3.5 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate JSAI’s precision and performance for a range of context-
sensitivities as described in Section 3.4, for a total of 56 distinct sensitivities. We run
each sensitivity on 28 benchmarks collected from four different application domains
and analyze the results, yielding surprising observations about context-sensitivity and
JavaScript. We also briefly evaluate JSAI as compared to TAJS [89], the most compa-
rable existing JavaScript analysis.
54
Chapter 3. JSAI: The JavaScript Abstract Interpreter
3.5.1 Implementation and Methodology
We implement JSAI using Scala version 2.10. We provide a model for the DOM,
event handling loop (handled as non-deterministic execution of event-handling func-
tions), and other native APIs used in our benchmarks. The baseline analysis sensitivity
we evaluate is fs (flow-sensitive, context-insensitive); all of the other evaluated sen-
sitivities are more precise than fs. The other sensitivities are: k.h-stack, h-acyclic,
k.h-obj, k.h-sig, and k.h-mixed, where k is the context depth for k-limiting and h is
the heap-sensitivity (i.e., the context depth used to distinguish abstract addresses). The
parameters k and h vary from 1 to 5 and h ≤ k.
We use a comprehensive benchmark suite to evaluate the sensitivities. Most prior
work on JavaScript static analysis has been evaluated only on the standard SunSpi-
der [10] and V8 [11] benchmarks, with a few micro-benchmarks thrown in. We evalu-
ate JSAI on these standard benchmarks, but we also include real-world representatives
from a diverse set of JavaScript application domains. We choose seven representative
programs from each domain, for a total of 28 programs. We partition the programs
into four categories, described below. For each category, we provide the mean size
of the benchmarks in the suite (expressed as number of AST nodes generated by the
Rhino parser [1]) and the mean translator blowup (i.e., the factor by which the number
of AST nodes increases when translating from JavaScript to notJS). The benchmark
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names are shown in the graphs presented below; the benchmark suite is included in the
supplementary material.
The benchmark categories are: standard: seven of the largest, most complex bench-
marks from SunSpider [10] and V8 [11] (mean size: 2858 nodes; mean blowup: 8×);
addon: seven Firefox browser addons selected from the official Mozilla addon repos-
itory [2] (mean size: 2597 nodes; mean blowup: 6×); generated: seven programs
from the Emscripten LLVM test suite, which translates LLVM bitcode to JavaScript [7]
(mean size: 38211 nodes; mean blowup: 7×); and finally opensrc: seven real-world
JavaScript programs taken from open source JavaScript frameworks and their test suites [12,
13] (mean size: 8784 nodes; mean blowup: 6.4×).
Our goal is to evaluate the precision and performance of JSAI instantiated with
several forms of context sensitivity. However, the different sensitivities yield differing
sets of function contexts and abstract addresses, making a fair comparison difficult.
Therefore, rather than statistical measurements (such as address-set size or closure-set
size), we choose a client-based precision metric based on a error reporting client. This
metric is a proxy for the precision of the analysis.
Our precision metric reports the number of static program locations (i.e., AST
nodes) that might throw exceptions, based on the analysis’ ability to precisely track
types. JavaScript throws a TypeError exception when a program attempts to call a
non-function or when a program tries to access, update, or delete a property of null or
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undef. JavaScript throws a RangeError exception when a program attempts to update
the length property of an array to contain a value that is not an unsigned 32-bit integer.
Fewer errors indicate a more precise analysis.
The performance metric we use is execution time of the analysis. To gather data
on execution time, we run each experimental configuration 11 times, discard the first
result, then report the median of the remaining 10 trials. We set a time limit of 30
minutes for each run, reporting a timeout if execution time exceeds that threshold. We
run all experiments on Amazon Web Services [14] (AWS), using M1 XLarge instances;
each experiment is run on an independent AWS instance. These instances have 15GB
memory and 8 ECUs, where each ECU is equivalent CPU capacity of a 1.0-1.2 GHz
2007 Opteron or 2007 Xeon processor.
We run all 56 analyses on each of the 28 benchmarks, for a total of 1,568 trials
(multiplied by an additional 10 executions for each analysis/benchmark pair for the
timing data). For reasons of space, we present only highlights of these results. In some
cases, we present illustrative examples; the omitted results show similar behavior. In
other cases, we deliberately cherry-pick, to highlight contrasts. We are explicit about
our approach in each case.
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Figure 3.6: A heat map to showcase the performance characteristics of different sen-
sitivities across the benchmark categories. For more details on how to read this map,
please refer to the corresponding prose.
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(a) addon benchmarks
tryagain 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16
odesk_job_wat… 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 18
less_spam_ple… 77% 77% 77% 13% 13% 0% 65% 16% 16% 62
live_pagerank 15% 15% 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 13
coffee_pods_d… 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5
chess 17% 17% 17% 8% 8% 0% 8% 8% 8% 24
pinpoints 2% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 54
(b) generated benchmarks
fasta 92% 94% 94% 17% 17% 0% 17% 92% 92% 36
llubenchmark 99% 99% 99% 0% 0% 21% 99% 99% 287
fourinarow 88% 92% 92% 0% 0% 0% 0% 88% 88% 24
aha 67% 70% 70% 0% 0% 7% 7% 67% 67% 27
sgefa 99% 99% 99% 0% 0% 21% 99% 99% 287
hashtest 91% 94% 94% 17% 17% 0% 17% 91% 91% 35
fannkuch 91% 94% 94% 18% 18% 0% 18% 91% 91% 33
(c) opensrc benchmarks
rsa 29% 32% 32% 0% 0% 0% 6% 9% 9% 34
linq_aggregate 88% 1% 2% 267
aes 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4
linq_enumerable 95% 99% 99% 2% 2% 7% 88% 0% 374
linq_functional 73% 89% 1% 12% 0% 0% 335
linq_action 92% 93% 96% 9% 10% 66% 75% 90% 90% 169
linq_dictionary 81% 85% 84% 1% 3% 1% 5% 73% 73% 376
(d) standard benchmarks
crypto-sha1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0
richards 0% 26% 26% 2% 2% 0% 0% 12% 12% 42
splay 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 30
3d-cube 8% 8% 8% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 8% 53
access-nbody 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6
3d-raytrace 29% 29% 29% 6% 6% 0% 8% 27% 27% 48
cryptobench 27% 76% 76% 6% 14% 21% 63% 10% 28% 329
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Figure 3.7: A heat map to showcase the precision characteristics (based on number of
reported runtime errors) of different sensitivities across the benchmark categories. For
more details on reading the heap please refer to the corresponding prose.
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3.5.2 Observations
For each main sensitivity strategy, we present the data for two trials: the least precise
sensitivity in that strategy, and the most precise sensitivity in that strategy. This set
of analyses is: fs, 1.0-stack, 5.4-stack, 4-acyclic, 1.0-obj, 5.4-obj, 1.0-sig, 5.4-sig,
1.0-mixed, 5.4-mixed.
Figure 3.6 contains performance results, and Figure 3.7 contains the precision re-
sults. The results are partitioned by benchmark category to show the effect of each
analysis sensitivity on benchmarks in that category.
Figure 3.6 is setup to easily depict how the sensitivities perform relative to each
other. Figure 3.6 is heat map that lays out blocks in two dimensions—rows represent
benchmarks and columns represent analyses with different sensitivities. Each block
represents relative performance as a color: darker blocks correspond to faster execu-
tion time of a sensitivity compared to other sensitivities on the same benchmark. A
completely blackened block corresponds to the fastest sensitivity on that benchmark,
a whitened block corresponds to a sensitivity that has ≥ 2× slowdown relative to the
fastest sensitivity, and the remaining colors evenly correspond to slowdowns in be-
tween. Blocks with the red grid pattern indicate a timeout. A visual cue is that columns
with darker blocks correspond to better-performing sensitivities, and a row with blocks
that have very similar colors indicates a benchmark on which performance is unaffected
by varying sensitivities.
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Figure 3.7 provides a similar heat map (with similar visual cues) for visualizing rel-
ative precisions of various sensitivity strategies on our benchmarks. The final column
in this heat map provides the number of errors reported by the fs strategy on a particular
benchmark, while the rest of the columns provide the percentage reduction (relative to
fs) in the number of reported errors due to a corresponding sensitivity strategy. The
various blocks (except the ones in the final column) are color coded in addition to pro-
viding percentage reduction numbers: darker is better precision (that is, more reduction
in number of reported errors). Timeouts are indicated using a red grid pattern.
Breaking the Glass Ceiling. One startling observation is that highly sensitive variants
(i.e., sensitivity strategies with high k and h parameters) can be far better than their
less-sensitive counterparts, providing improved precision at a much cheaper cost (see
Figure 3.8). For example, on linq dictionary, 5.4-stack is the most precise and
most efficient analysis. By contrast, the 3.2-stack analysis yields the same result at a
three-fold increase in cost, while the 1.0-stack analysis is even more expensive and less
precise. We see similar behavior for the sgefa benchmark, where 5.4-stack is an order
of magnitude faster than 1.0-stack and delivers the same results. This behavior violates
the common wisdom that values of k and h above 1 or 2 are intractably expensive.
This behavior is certainly not universal,6 but it is intriguing. Analysis designers
often try to scale up their context-sensitivity (in terms of k and h) linearly, and they
6For example, linq aggregate times out on all analyses with k > 1.
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5.4-stack
1.0-stack 5.4-obj
1.0-obj
fs
Figure 3.8: Precision vs. performance of various sensitivities, on the opensrc bench-
mark linq dictionary. Interestingly, 5.4-stack (the most sensitive Stack-CFA
analysis) is not only tractable, it exhibits the best performance and the best precision.
stop when it becomes intractable. However, our experiments suggest that pushing past
this local barrier may yield much better results.
Callstring vs Object Sensitivity. In general, we find that callstring-based sensitivity
(i.e., k.h-stack and h-acyclic) is more precise than object sensitivity (i.e., k.h-obj).
This result is unintuitive, since JavaScript heavily relies on objects and object sensi-
tivity was specifically designed for object-oriented languages such as Java. Through-
out the benchmarks, the most precise and efficient analyses are the ones that employ
stack-based k-CFA. Part of the reason for this trend is that 25% of the benchmarks are
machine-generated JavaScript versions of procedural code, whose structure yields more
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benefits to callstring-based context-sensitivity. Even among the handwritten open-
source benchmarks, however, this trend holds. For example, several forms of call-
string sensitivity are more efficient and provide more precise results for the open-source
benchmarks than object-sensitivity, which often times out.
Benefits of Context Sensitivity. When it comes to pure precision, we find that more
context sensitivity sometimes increases precision and sometimes has no effect. The
open-source benchmarks demonstrate quite a bit of variance for the precision metric. A
context-sensitive analysis almost always finds fewer errors (i.e., fewer false positives)
than a context-insensitive analysis, and increasing the sensitivity in a particular family
leads to precision gains. For example, 5.4-stack gives the most precise error report for
linq enumerable, and it is an order of magnitude more precise than a context-
insensitive analysis. On the other hand, the addon domain has very little variance
for the precision metric, which is perhaps due to shorter call sequence lengths in this
domain. In such domains, it might be wise to focus on performance, rather than in-
creasing precision.
Summary. Perhaps the most sweeping claim we can make from the data is that there is
no clear winner across all benchmarks, in terms of JavaScript context-sensitivity. This
state of affairs is not a surprise: the application domains for JavaScript are so rich and
varied that finding a silver bullet for precision and performance is unlikely. However,
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it is likely that—within an application domain, e.g., automatically generated JavaScript
code—one form of context-sensitivity could emerge a clear winner. The benefit of
JSAI is that it is easy to experiment with the control flow sensitivity of an analysis. The
base analysis has already been specified, the analysis designer need only instantiate and
evaluate multiple instances of the analysis in a modular way to tune analysis-sensitivity,
without having to worry about the analysis soundness.
3.5.3 Discussion: JSAI vs. TAJS
Jensen et al.’s Type Analysis for JavaScript [89, 90] (TAJS) stands as the only pub-
lished static analysis for JavaScript whose intention is to soundly analyze the entire
JavaScript language. JSAI has several features that TAJS does not, including con-
figurable sensitivity, a formalized abstract semantics, and novel abstract domains, but
TAJS is a valuable contribution that has been put to good use. An interesting question
is how JSAI compares to TAJS in terms of precision and performance.
The TAJS implementation (in Java) has matured over a period of five years, it has
been heavily optimized, and it is publicly available. Ideally, we could directly compare
TAJS to JSAI with respect to precision and performance, but they are dissimilar enough
that they are effectively noncomparable. For one, TAJS has known soundness bugs that
can artificially decrease its set of reported type errors. Also, TAJS does not implement
some of the APIs required by our benchmark suite, and so it can only run on a subset of
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the benchmarks. On the flip side, TAJS is more mature than JSAI, it has a more precise
implementation of the core JavaScript APIs, and it contains a number of precision and
performance optimizations (e.g., the recency heap abstraction [37] and lazy propagation
[90]) that JSAI does not currently implement.
Nevertheless, we can perform a qualitative “ballpark” comparison, to demonstrate
that JSAI is roughly comparable in terms of precision and performance. For the subset
of our benchmarks on which both JSAI and TAJS execute, we catalogue the number of
errors that each tool reports and record the time it took for each tool to do so. We find
that JSAI analysis time is 0.3× to 1.8× that of TAJS. In terms of precision, JSAI reports
from nine fewer type errors to 104 more type errors, compared to TAJS. Many of the
extra type errors that JSAI reports are RangeErrors, which TAJS does not report due to
one of the unsoundness bugs we uncovered. Excluding RangeErrors, JSAI reports at
most 20 more errors than TAJS in the worst case.
3.6 Conclusion
We have described the design of JSAI, a configurable, sound, and efficient abstract
interpreter for JavaScript. JSAI’s design is novel in a number of respects which make
it stand out from all previous JavaScript analyzers. We have provided a comprehen-
sive evaluation that demonstrates JSAI’s usefulness. The JSAI implementation and
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formalisms are freely available as a supplement, and we believe that JSAI will provide
a useful platform for people building JavaScript analyses.
Our future work includes (1) taking advantage of JSAI’s configurability to further
investigate what control-flow sensitivities are most useful for JavaScript; (2) writing a
number of clients on top of JSAI, including program refactoring, program compression;
and (3) extending JSAI to handle language features from the latest ECMA 5 standard.
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Improving Precision of JavaScript
Static Analysis via Type Refinement
4.1 Introduction
Dynamic languages have become ubiquitous. For example, Java-Script is used to
implement a large amount of critical online infrastructure, including web applications,
browser addons/extensions, and interpreters such as Adobe Flash. In response to the
growing prominence of dynamic languages, the research community has begun to in-
vestigate how to apply static analysis techniques in this domain. Static analysis is used
to deduce properties of a program’s execution behavior; these properties can be used
for a variety of useful purposes including optimization [79, 109], error checking [144],
verification [46], security auditing [73, 74], and program refactoring [64], among other
uses. However, dynamic languages present a unique challenge to static analysis, inher-
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ent in their very name: the dynamic nature of these languages makes creating precise,
sound, and efficient static analyses a daunting task.
In this chapter we focus on the static analysis of JavaScript, though in principle
our proposed techniques are applicable to other dynamic languages as well. Our work
is complementary to other recent work on JavaScript analysis, which has focused on
understanding a program’s types by proposing various novel abstract domains to track
type information [89, 109]. This focus on types is essential for JavaScript analysis;
because JavaScript behavior relies heavily on the runtime types of the values being
operated on, understanding types is a necessary prerequisite to understanding many
other properties of program behavior. However, with one exception (discussed further
in Section 6.7) this prior work on JavaScript analysis has ignored an observation that
has been profitably exploited in more traditional static analyses: that branch conditions
(i.e., predicates that determine a program’s control flow) necessarily constrain the set
of values that can flow into the corresponding branches. This observation can be used
to refine the abstract information propagated by the static analysis within each branch,
thus improving the precision of the analysis. The details of how this concept works
and how it can be applied to improve the precision of static analysis are explained
in Appendix 6.2 (for any analysis in general) and Section 4.2 (for JavaScript analysis
specifically).
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While this general observation is well-known in the static analysis community, ap-
plying it specifically to JavaScript raises several important questions that must be an-
swered to gain any useful benefit: (1) what kinds of conditions provide the most useful
information for refinement; (2) how prevalent are these kinds of conditions in realistic
JavaScript programs; and (3) how can we best exploit these conditions, based on their
prevalence and usefulness, to substantially increase the precision of static analysis?
4.1.1 Key Insight
Our key insight that informs our proposed technique is that the most prevalent and
useful conditional branches are not explicit in the text of JavaScript program, i.e., these
conditions do not show up syntactically as if or while statements. Rather, they are im-
plicit in the JavaScript semantics themselves. As an example, consider the statement
var result = myString.length;. While syntactically there are no conditional
branches in this statement, during execution there are several conditional branches
taken by the JavaScript interpreter:
• Is myString either null or undefined? If so then raise a type-error exception,
otherwise continue execution.
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• Is myString a primitive value or an object? If it’s a primitive value then convert
it to an object first, then access the length property; otherwise just access the
length property.
• Does the object (or one of its prototypes) contain a length property? If so then
return the corresponding value, otherwise return undefined.
Our thesis is that JavaScript static analysis can take advantage of these implicit
conditional executions to refine the type information of the abstract values being propa-
gated by the analysis, and that this type refinement can provide significant improvement
in analysis precision.
4.1.2 Contributions
Our specific contributions are:
• A definition of type refinement for static analysis of JavaScript, including several
variations that use different kinds of conditions to refine types (Section 4.2).
• An empirical evaluation of the proposed type refinement variations (Section 6.6).
This evaluation is carried out on a more comprehensive set of JavaScript bench-
marks than any presented in previous literature on JavaScript static analysis; it
includes not only the standard SunSpider and V8 benchmark suites, but also a
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number of open-source JavaScript applications [13,26] and a number of machine-
generated JavaScript programs created using Emscripten [7].
• A set of recommendations for including type refinement in JavaScript analyses
(Section 4.6). Our evaluation shows that taking advantage of implicit conditional
branches provides a critical precision advantage for finding type errors, while the
explicit typeof conditional branches exploited in previous work [78] provide
only marginal benefit.
We conclude that type refinement is a promising technique for JavaScript analy-
sis. This technique’s design is informed by the semantics of JavaScript, enabling it to
take advantage of language features hidden from plain sight and thus gain precision
that would be lost by a technique that does not specifically exploit JavaScript seman-
tics. Furthermore, type refinement is orthogonal to the question of designing abstract
domains for JavaScript analysis; this means that it can profitably be combined with
interesting new abstract domains in the future to achieve even better results.
4.2 The Potential for Refinement in JavaScript
Refinement allows an analysis to safely replace a less-precise answer with a more-
precise answer. Appendix 6.2 gives suitable background on static analysis and the
concept of refinement; readers unfamiliar with these notions may wish to refer to that
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appendix before continuing. Refinement can apply to many different abstract domains
for analysis, but we hypothesize that, for JavaScript, the abstract domain of types is
a particularly fruitful target for refinement. In JavaScript, as with many dynamic lan-
guages, the type of a value strongly influences the behavior of a program. Thus, refining
type information intuitively would seem likely to improve the precision of JavaScript
static analysis (and our empirical results bear out this intuition).
This observation means that we should focus our attention on those conditionals
in the JavaScript program that are based on type information, i.e., conditionals whose
truth or falsity constrain the set of types allowed in the corresponding branches. An
obvious candidate is the set of conditionals that use the typeofoperator to test value’s
types. For example, consider the following code:
if ( typeof x == "number" ) { x = x + 42; }
Suppose that immediately before the conditional, the static analysis has computed
that x may be a number or a string. Then inside the true branch of the conditional,
we can safely refine the type of x to be a number. This strategy is similar to the one
employed by Guha et al [78] (discussed further in Section 6.7), though they were at-
tempting to typecheck a subset of JavaScript rather than to improve the precision of
JavaScript static analysis.
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4.2.1 Key Insight
While the typeof check is an obvious candidate for refinement, our key insight
is that most of the conditionals involving types aren’t even syntactically present in
the JavaScript program—rather, they are implicit in the semantics of the JavaScript
language itself.
Consider the following statement:
var x = myString[i];
This seemingly simple statement requires a large number of implicit type checks.
Example 2 makes all of these checks explicit. None of these checks involve typeof.
Instead, we see three new kinds of conditions that involve type information.
One condition (e.g., at line 1 in Example 2) checks whether a value is either null or
undefined. JavaScript performs this check whenever a program attempts to access a
property of a value; if the value is null or undefined it is a type-error. JavaScript also
performs this check whenever a program attempts to add, update, or delete a property
of some value. We abbreviate this condition as isUndefNull.
Another condition (e.g., at lines 5, 12, 22, and 31) checks whether a value is primi-
tive rather than an object, i.e., that it is either a number, a boolean, a string, undefined,
or null1. JavaScript performs this check whenever the runtime might need to implic-
itly convert a value into another type. We abbreviate this condition as isPrim.
1Confusingly, typeof null == ”object”, but null is not an object.
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Example 2 The semantics of var x = myString[i ];
1: if myString is null or undefined then
2: type-error
3: else
4: // convert myString to an object first?
5: if myString is a primitive then
6: obj = toObject(myString)
7: else
8: obj = myString
9: end if
10: // convert i to a string
11: // case 1: i is a primitive
12: if i is a primitive then
13: prop = toString(i)
14: else
15: if i.toString is callable then
16: tmp = i.toString()
17: else
18: goto line 26
19: end if
20: end if
21: // case 2: i is not a primitive, but i.toString() is
22: if tmp is a primitive then
23: prop = toString(tmp)
24: // case 3: i.toString() is not a primitive; try i.valueOf()
25: else
26: if i.valueOf is callable then
27: tmp2 = i.valueOf()
28: else
29: type-error
30: end if
31: if tmp2 is a primitive then
32: prop = toString(tmp2)
33: else
34: type-error
35: end if
36: end if
37: // retrieve the property from the object
38: x = obj.prop
39: end if
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A third condition (e.g., at lines 15 and 26) checks whether a value is callable (i.e.,
that it is actually a function). If so, then the runtime calls the function; otherwise it
can throw a type error exception. We abbreviate this check for callable as the isFunc
condition.
The key insight of this work is to focus refinement on those implicit conditionals—
isPrim, isUndefNull, and isFunc—which abound in JavaScript programs.
4.2.2 Refinement on Implicit Conditions
JavaScript’s implicit conditions restrict the types of values that flow along their
branches. Refinement can take advantage of these restrictions as follows:
• isPrim: On the true branch, the checked value must be a primitive value; on the
false branch it must be an object.
• isUndefNull: On the true branch, the checked value must be either undefined
or null; on the false branch it cannot be undefined or null.
• isFunc: On the true branch, the checked value must be a function; on the false
branch it cannot be a function.
The benefits become evident when we consider a static analysis that does not use
refinement for these conditions. For isPrim the benefit comes from the false branch
of the conditional, for example, line 15 in Example 2. Suppose that on line 12 the
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analysis computes that imay be either undefined or an object. In the false branch, i’s
properties are accessed to make method calls (e.g., the .toString and/or .valueOf
methods used to convert objects to primitives). However, since i may be undefined,
the analysis conservatively computes that these calls may raise a type error exception.
If i had been refined, then the analysis would know that it cannot be undefined on
that branch, and hence there cannot be a type error exception.
The benefit for isUndefNull and isFunc is more subtle. Consider the following
program fragment:
d e l e t e o b j . p1 ;
o b j . p2 = 2 ;
Example 3 The semantics of delete obj .p1; obj .p2 = 2;
1: if obj is null or undefined then
2: type-error
3: else
4: delete obj.p1
5: if obj is null or undefined then
6: type-error
7: else
8: obj.p2 = 2
9: end if
10: end if
The implicit behavior of this fragment is described by the pseudocode in Exam-
ple 3.This example illustrates how implicit checks and exceptions can lead to spurious
type-errors. Concretely, the code performs two sequential property modifications. If
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obj is null or undefined, the first statement causes a type-error, and the second
statement never executes. Otherwise, both statements execute successfully. An analy-
sis that uses refinement can capture this behavior, while an analysis that does not use
refinement cannot, as explained below.
Consider an analysis of this fragment that has imprecise information: obj might be
null or an object. In this case, the isUndefNull conditions in lines 1 and 5 of Exam-
ple 3 are non-deterministic, and the analysis must conservatively propgate obj’s type
to both branches. An analysis that does not use refinement must then conservatively
report that two type-errors might occur: at lines 2 and 6. In reality, if the first statement
of the program fragment successfully executes, so will the second. Refinement can
detect this invariant: in the false branch of lines 4–9, the type of obj cannot be null
or undefined. The isUndefNull condition at line 5 is therefore deterministic, so the
analysis will not follow the branch to the error at line 6. Thus, a refined analysis can
give the most precise result for imprecise data: if a type-error occurs, it occurs only as
a result of the delete statement.
The isFunc check is similar to the isUndefNull check in that the cost comes from
potentially passing unrefined values to successor nodes, causing the analysis to con-
servatively compute type error exceptions whereas an analysis using refinement would
not. In general, the benefit of refinement in the presence of implicit exceptions is poten-
tially tremendous: When exploring the path along which the exception does not occur,
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the analysis can refine the type of the value so that it does not cause any more implicit
exceptions along that path. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that, if an analysis
focuses on these simple implicit type checks, refinement can dramatically increase the
precision of a type-error analysis.
4.3 Refining Types in JavaScript Analyses
The previous section discusses type refinement at a conceptual level. In this section
we make the discussion concrete, describing specifically how we perform type refine-
ment for JavaScript. Type refinement takes place in the context of some particular static
analysis, however type refinement itself is largely independent of that surrounding con-
text. Therefore we describe type refinement using a generic type-based abstract domain
that would be common to any JavaScript static analysis, which in the actual analysis
can be augmented to provide whatever additional information is relevant.
4.3.1 Type-based Abstract Domain
We now describe the abstract domain that we will be using to describe type refine-
ment. A JavaScript value can be a primitive value (i.e., number, boolean, string,
undefined, or null), an object, or a function2. The abstract domain of Figure 4.1
2Functions are also objects, but we distinguish them separately because some implicit checks are
specific to functions.
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σ ∈ Store : Variable → P(Type)
PropertyMap : Property → P(Type)
τ ∈ Type : PrimType + ObjType + FuncType
PrimType : num + bool + +null + undefined
ObjType : PropertyMap
FuncType : Closure × PropertyMap
Figure 4.1: A simplified version of an abstract domain suitable for type refinement.
The abstract domain Store maps variables to their abstract types. The abstract do-
main ObjType maps object properties to a set of possible types. The abstract domain
FuncType includes a closure (the function to be called) and a property map (to model
the function object).
describes an approximation of these types. This abstract domain is deliberately simpler
than one that would be used in an actual analysis, in order to make the exposition more
clear by focusing on the aspects relevant to type refinement. A specific static analysis
would augment this abstract domain with more information relevant to the purpose of
that analysis (for examples of such augmented abstract domains, see [89, 109]).
The abstract domain in the figure represents the relevant type information that is
propagated by the analysis from program point to program point. An abstract store
Store maps variable names to sets of abstract types. We uses sets of types because, as
discussed in Section 6.2, the analysis is approximating the concrete program behavior—
e.g., the analysis may be able to determine that a variable is either num or undefined,
but not be able to narrow the type information down any further. An abstract object
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x ∈ Variable p ∈ Property
a ∈ Access ::= x | x.p
c ∈ Condition ::= typeof(a) = tag | isFunc(a)
| isUndefNull(a) | isPrim(a)
tag ::= ”number” | ”boolean” | ”string”
| ”undefined” | ”object” | ”function”
Figure 4.2: Type-based conditions for refinement. These conditions precisely describe
the conditonal expressions that trigger refinement. An access is a low-level primitive—
the simplest form of a variable or property access. Our analysis can handle any condi-
tional expression that reduces to this form.
type ObjType maps property names to their abstract types. An abstract function type
FuncType consists of a closure (the function to be called) and a property map (to model
the fact that JavaScript functions are also objects).
A type-based static analysis operates over this abstract domain. Abstract stores flow
along the program’s control-flow graph (where each node is a program statement), and
at each statement the analysis interprets the effect of that statement relative to a specific
input σ flowing from that statement’s predecessors, in order to determine the new σ′
that is the output of that statement, which is then passed to that statement’s successors.
If the analysis encounters a type-based condition, the analysis may be able to increase
the precision of the information contained in the store by refining the type information
based on the condition, as described below.
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4.3.2 Identifying Relevant Type-based Conditions
When using type refinement, the analysis interprets a branch condition as a filter
along each branch of the conditional; these filters are used to refine the type informa-
tion of the stores passed to each respective branch. In theory, any branch condition
that constrains the types contained in the store can be used to perform type refinement.
However, in practice some conditions are much more complicated to translate into fil-
ters than others. Therefore the analysis designer must make a tradeoff, by syntactically
restricting the set of conditions from which the analysis extracts filters. The goal is to
balance the additional precision that may be gained by interpreting certain conditions
against the complexity of generating filters from those conditions.
Figure 4.2 shows the tradeoff that we have made in our type refinement implemen-
tation. The figure gives a restricted syntax for branch conditions (which also makes
certain implicit checks explicit in the syntax rather than implicit in the language se-
mantics). Our analysis only attempts refinement using conditions that are contained in
this restricted syntax; any other conditions are treated the same as if the analysis were
not doing type refinement. We chose this syntax to match the categories of explicit and
implicit type checks from Section 4.2. The typeofcondition corresponds to implicit
and explicit checks on type equality. The isFunc condition corresponds to the implicit
check for whether a value is a function. The isUndefNull condition corresponds to the
implicit check that the JavaScript interpreter performs when accessing or modifying
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an object property. The isPrim condition corresponds to the implicit check that the
JavaScript interpreter performs as part of implicit type conversion.
Each condition contains exactly one access. An access can have two forms: a
variable or a direct property access. A direct property access x.p gives the precise
property name being accessed. The program need not literally contain a direct access;
the program might specify the property access using a complex expression. As long as
the static analysis can recover the direct access from the expression, the analysis will
attempt to apply refinement. In practice, for typeofconditions, our analysis handles
any conditions of the form typeofe1 == e2, where e1 and e2 are arbitrary JavaScript
expressions. Our analysis currently does not handle more complex expressions than
these. In particular, it does not handle logical combinations of these conditions. In
Section 6.6, we demonstrate that the conditions in Figure 4.2 are sufficient to achieve
significant increases in the precision of a type-based analysis; creating useful filters for
more complicated expressions is left to future work.
4.3.3 Filtering Type Information
Each condition induces a filter that captures the types described by that condition.
Figure 4.3 defines the filter for each possible condition. These filters match the descrip-
tion of the explicit and implicit information encoded in the scenarios from Section 4.2.
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c ∈ Condition filter(c)
typeof(a) = ”number” {num}
typeof(a) = ”boolean” {bool}
typeof(a) = ”string” {str}
typeof(a) = ”undefined” {undefined}
typeof(a) = ”object” {null} ∪ObjType
typeof(a) = ”function” FuncType
isFunc(a) FuncType
isUndefNull(a) {undefined,null}
isPrim(a) {τp ∈ PrimType}
Figure 4.3: Filters for refinement conditions. The analysis uses these filters to refine
information along a condition’s branches.
The analysis uses a condition’s filters to refine the values that flow along the condition’s
branches. Specifically, for each type-based condition c:
1. The analysis interprets condition c relative to an input store σ, to determine which
branches (i.e, the true and false branches) to execute.
2. The analysis uses the input store σ to retrieve the abstract type τ of the condition’s
access a.
3. When the analysis executes the true branch, it computes a new abstract type for a
as follows: τ ∩ filter(c). In other words, it intersects the current set of possible
types for a with the set of possible types for a allowed by the branch condition.
The analysis updates the type for a in σ and sends the updated store along the
true branch.
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4. When the analysis executes the false branch, it computes a new abstract type for
a as follows: τ −filter(c). In other words, it removes from the current set of pos-
sible types for a those types which would have meant that the branch condition
was true. The analysis updates the type for a in σ and sends the updated store
along the false branch.
For example, suppose the analysis reaches a condition isUndefNull(a) with a store
that maps a to the abstract type {undefined,num}. In this case the condition evalu-
ates to both true and false, and so the analysis must execute both the true and false
branches. Along the true branch, the analysis sends a store that assigns a the type
{undefined,num} ∩ filter(isUndefNull(a)) = {undefined}. Along the false branch,
the analysis sends a store that assigns a the type {undefined,num}−filter(isUndefNull(.)) =
{num}.
4.3.4 Sound Type Refinement
Type refinement is sound if and only if the filtered set of types sent to a branch is
a superset of all types that might ever be seen at that branch over all possible concrete
executions. Our refinement rules are sound as long as they are only applied to accesses
that correspond to a single concrete access. This is the standard static analysis issue
of strong vs weak updates: a strong update can replace a value with a completely new
value (potentially more precise than the previous value), while a weak update can only
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replace a value with a weaker (i.e., less precise) value. This issue is best explained by
example.
Suppose that a variable x is mapped by the abstract store to the set of types {[foo 7→
{num, str}], [foo 7→ {num,bool}]}. This abstract value means that the type of x may
be one or the other of the two object types, but the analysis does not know which
one. Now suppose that the analysis is considering a branch condition typeof(x.foo) =
”number”. In the true branch, the type of x.foo must be num. However, the analysis
does not know which of the two possible object types for x is correct, so it cannot
determine which of the two object types has been constrained by the condition. Thus,
the analysis cannot refine either object type because if it refines the wrong one, the
analysis becomes unsound. When this is the case, any update to the abstract value for
x must be weak: an analysis cannot replace the abstract value of x with a more precise
version.
If, on the other hand, x refers to only a single possible object type, e.g., {[foo 7→
{num, str}]}, then an analysis knows that this is the type constrained by the condition.
Thus, the analysis can safely refine x’s value in the true branch to {[foo 7→ {num}]}.
When this is the case, an update to the abstract value for x can be strong: the analysis
can replace x’s abstract value with a more precise value. Our analysis applies type
refinement—which overwrites abstract values—only when the refinement corresponds
to a strong update.
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4.4 Evaluation
We have implemented our proposed ideas and evaluated their effect on a static anal-
ysis for JavaScript that detects potential type-error exceptions. We find that an analysis
that performs type refinement on all of the conditions described in Section 4.3.2 can
achieve a significant increase in analysis precision, with a minimal impact on the anal-
ysis performance. In this section we demonstrate the effectiveness of our ideas by
comparing the type-error analysis with type refinement relative to the same analysis
without type refinement, for a variety of JavaScript programs.
4.4.1 JavaScript Analysis Framework
We use the JSAI JavaScript static analyzer for our experiments. The source code
for JSAI can be found at http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/˜pllab under Downloads.
JSAI is implemented in Scala version 2.10.1 using the Rhino parser as a front-end [1].
JSAI does not currently handle eval and related mechanisms for dynamic code injec-
tion, however none of our benchmarks use these mechanisms.
4.4.2 Benchmark Suite
JavaScript can be written in a number of different styles, and these styles can affect
the usefulness of our type refinement technique. In order to explore this issue, we select
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benchmarks from a variety of application domains. We group the selected bencharks
into three categories:
• standard: These are the standard benchmark suites, SunSpider [?] and Oc-
tane [27], that are used by browser vendors to test the correctness and perfor-
mance of their JavaScript implementations.
• opensrc: These are real-world, handwritten JavaScript programs taken from vari-
ous open source projects such as LINQ for JavaScript [26] and Defensive JS [13].
• emscripten: These are machine-generated JavaScript code, obtained by compil-
ing C/C++ programs using the Emscripten [7] LLVM→JavaScript compiler.
We select seven benchmarks from each category for our evaluation. This benchmark
suite is available for download3. The benchmarks exercise a wide range of JavaScript
features, including core objects and APIs, typed arrays, etc. However, none of these
benchmarks contain eval or equivalent features that allow dynamic code injection.
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of program sizes in each benchmark category,
based on the number of AST nodes created for the programs by the Rhino parser. We
use AST nodes as the metric for program size because it correlates with the amount of
work done by the analysis, which operates over AST nodes. The standard benchmarks,
while not large, exercise several key features of the language, and we use them to test
3Available with the rest of the repository under Downloads at http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/
˜pllab.
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Figure 4.4: Graph to show size distribution (along y-axis) of benchmarks in each cate-
gory (x-axis). Size is measured in terms of number of JavaScript AST nodes created by
the Rhino parser [1]. For each benchmark category, the blue box gives the 25%-75%
quartiles, the blue line gives the range of sizes, and median and mean are denoted by
red and black dots respectively.
the correctness of our implementation. The opensrc and emscripten benchmarks are
significantly larger, however it should be noted that the emscripten benchmarks contain
a large amount of unreachable code because the Emscripten compiler automatically
includes a large amount of unused library code.
4.4.3 Experimental Methodology
Our base analysis is flow-sensitive and context-sensitive, using a stack-based 1-
CFA context-sensitivity strategy (i.e., it distinguishes function contexts by the callsite
from which the function was invoked). The heap model uses static allocation sites to
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model abstract addresses. Starting from this base type-error analysis, we implement
new analyses that incrementally add support for refining various kinds of conditions.
We implement and evaluate a total of four type-error analyses:
• B: a base flow-sensitive, context-sensitive type-error analysis that does not per-
form refinement.
• T: the B analysis, extended with type refinement for conditionals that contain
typeofchecks.
• TP: the T analysis, extended to include type refinement for conditionals that
contain isPrim checks.
• TPUNF: the TP analysis extended to include type refinement for conditionals
that contain isUndefNull and isFunc checks.
We compare the precision and performance of these analyses for all the benchmarks
in our suite. The metric we use to measure precision is the number of program locations
(i.e., AST nodes) that the analysis computes may potentially throw type-error excep-
tions. The analysis that reports the fewest locations is the most precise. This metric
correlates with the usefulness of a static type-error reporting tool: although false posi-
tives are inherent in a static analysis, the fewer the number of reported errors (i.e., the
fewer the false positives) the more useful the tool is.
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The metric we use to measure performance is execution time in seconds. We per-
form a trial for each (analysis, benchmark) pair. Each trial runs in its own invocation of
the JVM. A trial starts with a warm-up run whose results are discarded. We then per-
form 10 runs in sequence and report the mean execution time of these 10 runs. All our
experiments execute on an Ubuntu 12.04.2 LTS machine with CPU speed of 1.9GHz
and 32GB RAM on JVM version 1.7.
4.4.4 Potential Opportunity for Type Refinement
In this section, we explore the potential benefits of type refinement across our
benchmark categories. Type refinement is potentially useful for a given branch con-
dition when the analysis treats that condition as non-deterministic—i.e., the analysis
cannot determine for certain which branch is taken, and so must execute both branches.
To gain an understanding of how many opportunities various flavors of type refinement
can take advantage of in these benchmarks, we distinguish three kinds of branches:
• T: Branches with a typeofcheck in them.
• P: Branches with a isPrim check in them.
• UNF: Branches with a isUndefNull or isFunc check in them.
We also qualify each kind of branch to be:
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• D: a deterministic branch.
• NDC: a non-deterministic branch where the branch condition follows our re-
stricted syntax for type refinement, and therefore is a candidate for our type re-
finement.
• NDNC: a non-deterministic branch where the branch condition does not match
our restricted syntax for type refinement, and therefore is not a candidate for our
type refinement.
Deterministic branches D provide no opportunity for type refinement at all. Non-
deterministic, non-candidate branches NDNC could potentially benefit from type re-
finement if we extended our technique to include more complicated branches, but do
not benefit from our current type refinement implementation. The non-deterministic
candidate branches NDC are the branches that can benefit from our current implemen-
tation of type refinement.
We provide the above information about each qualified kind of branch for each
benchmark category, using the B version of the analysis, and summarize the data in Ta-
ble 4.1. The data shows that the deterministic branches far exceed the non-deterministic
ones. This might seem surprising, but the reason is because the analysis must perform
a number of checks that are almost always trivially true. For example, in the code
a[0] = 0, the analysis checks that a is not undefined or null, and in a vast major-
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category branch kind D NDC NDNC
standard
T 469 87 104
P 2408 141 0
UNF 5692 571 0
opensrc
T 408 82 50
P 2048 80 0
UNF 9456 374 0
emscripten
T 149 14 9
P 595 3 0
UNF 7120 12 0
Table 4.1: The table that shows for each category of benchmarks, the kind of branches
that the analysis encounters. The numbers represent number of program locations. The
abbreviations are further detailed in Section 4.4.4. The way to interpret this table is
as follows: for example, the number under column NDC, and row T represents the
number of program locations with branches that have typeof checks in them, and are
non-deterministic and match our grammar for type refinement.
ity of cases this is true, making this conditional deterministic. This is particularly true
of the emscripten benchmarks, which makes sense because they were generated from
statically-typed languages. Although most branch points are deterministic, there are
still a significant number of non-deterministic branches that can be exploited by type
refinement.
4.4.5 Effects of Various Type Refinements
Table 4.2 presents the raw data of our evaluation, including the total number of
type errors reported for each benchmark and the mean runtimes for the B and TPUNF
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analyses. Figure 4.5 extracts and summarizes the precision results from Table 4.2.
For each benchmark, we provide the number of type-errors reported by the analysis
under the four configurations (B, T, TP and TPUNF—columns 2–5), the percentage
reduction in number of type errors reported when run with TPUNF version over the B
version (column 6), the mean runtime in seconds when run with B and TPUNF versions
(columns 7 and 8, respectively), and the percentage increase in time taken of TPUNF
version over B version (column 9). We also summarize for each benchmark category,
the total number of error reports across benchmarks in that category for each version
of the analysis, and the mean runtime for running the analysis under B and TPUNF
versions across the benchmarks in that category. The mean performance data has a
relative standard deviation of at most 30%.
For the standard and opensrc benchmarks, the T configuration yields almost no ben-
efit over the B configuration, meaning that doing type refinement over this kind of con-
dition is not useful for reducing type-error exceptions. However, the TP configuration
does yield a fair amount of benefit, and the TPUNF configuration yields significant
benefit. For example, on the cryptobench benchmark in the standard category the
TPUNF configuration reports 253 fewer type errors than the B, and for rsa in open-
src category, 124 fewer errors are reported by TPUNF configuration when compared
to B. In general, across benchmarks in the standard and opensrc categories, most of
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the benefits arise from type refinement for isPrim, isUndefNull and isFunc implicit
checks.
For the emscripten benchmarks, type refinement does not make a significant impact
on precision—this is expected based on the low potential available in these benchmarks
for type refinement (see Figure 4.1), and because there are very few type-errors reported
in the B version already. Because emscripten benchmarks are generated by compiling
from a statically-typed language, the values in the program tend to be very monomor-
phic.
From Table 4.2, specifically the column giving the percentage increase in time, we
observe that type refinements have a negligible effect on performance.
4.5 Related Work
Static analysis of dynamic languages is an active research area. Recent innova-
tions include: a type analysis that relies on an abstract domain that is highly tuned for
JavaScript [89]; various static type inference algorithms [34, 69] and hybrid type in-
ference algorithms [33], including those that prevent access to undefined fields [144],
enable program optimizations [79, 109], or are suitable for IDEs [124]; static analy-
ses to secure the Web [72–74]; alias analyses for JavaScript [85, 133] and Python [71];
an analysis to support JavaScript refactoring [64]; and analysis frameworks for dy-
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namic languages [28, 104]. All these techniques are orthogonal to type refinement. As
such, they all may benefit from the idea of refinement in general, and the analyses for
JavaScript would benefit directly from our contribution.
Two existing techniques for type inference of dynamic languages rely in partic-
ular on a notion of refinement: flow typing [78] and occurrence typing [136, 137].
Flow typing is a technique for JavaScript type inference that uses type tags in explicit
typeof conditionals to filter type information [78]. Occurrence typing is another
technique for refining types in branches based on the conditionals that govern those
branches [136, 137]. Occurrence typing takes into consideration a more complex set
of filters than flow typing and type refinement, including the effects of selectors (e.g.,
car). These filters are encoded in a propositional logic that forms the basis of a type
system for Scheme.
Our work, type refinement, leverages a similar insight as does flow typing and oc-
currence typing, namely that runtime types in a dynamically typed language are con-
strained by branch conditions. Perhaps the most important distinction between our
work and prior work is the focus on which branch conditions are mined by the analysis
to obtain more precise information. Flow and occurrence typing focuses on branches
that occur in common coding idioms: explicit behavior, encoded by a programmer, that
follows a particular pattern. The reasoning behind this focus is that the programmers
are communicating information by using an idiom, and automated understanding can
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take advantage of this high-level semantic information. Type refinement focuses on
implicit behavior driven by the runtime: behavior encoded not by the programmer, but
by the semantics of the language itself. The reasoning behind this focus is that implicit
behavior (i.e., the semantics of the language) appears in every program, and if the anal-
ysis can take advantage of this behavior the potential benefit can be huge. In the context
of type errors, our study shows that a focus on the implicit JavaScript behavior provides
more benefit that the focus on only explicit JavaScript behavior.
Type refinement also differs from prior work in its goals and methods. The goal
of flow and occurrence typing is a sound static type system for a dynamic language.
Hence, Guha et al. and Tobin-Hochstadt et al. focus on type soundness (although
Guha et al. also validate their work against a corpus of Scheme code). In contrast, the
goal for our work is to provide more precise information for JavaScript static analyses,
which we validate by performing an evaluation of several variants against a large corpus
of JavaScript programs. Operationally, our work differs from prior work in that prior
work encodes the extra type information in the abstract domain, explicitly representing
the information and essentially delaying the refinement. Ours work filters the results
along a path, essentially applying the refinement immediately.
Type refinement should not be confused with refinement types [46, 68]. Although
they have similar names and share other superficial similarities, they are different con-
cepts. Type refinement is an action that occurs during program analysis: it filters the
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analysis values that flow along paths in the program’s abstract execution. An analysis
with type refinement is more precise than one without it. A refinement type is an entity,
placed in a program by its author to express a restriction on the set of values that can be
computed by a particular expression. A type system with refinement types can prove
stronger properties about programs than one without them.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
We show in this work that type refinement is a useful precision optimization for
static analysis of JavaScript. In particular, type refinement for implicit conditionals in
JavaScript can have a significant impact on precision (upto 86% for a static type-error
client). We also show that type refinement does not cause any adverse performance
impact.
We can do type refinements only if the refinement can be a strong update, thus, we
can increase the precision due to type refinement by implementing orthogonal tech-
niques that can increase the number of strong updates. We are currently exploring re-
cency abstraction [37, 84], which is a technique that can increase the number of strong
updates in the analysis. It would be interesting to study the effect of combining type
refinement with recency abstraction.
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We would also like to extend our type refinement to more complicate conditionals,
and explore how far we can increase precision benefits without affecting adversely
performance.
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Improving Performance of Static
Analysis via Parallelization
5.1 Introduction
JavaScript is prevalent on a wide variety of platforms, including the web, mobile
phones, desktops, and servers. Static analysis for JavaScript is a necessity to help
build developer tools to construct and review secure, fast, maintainable, and correct
JavaScript code. In order to be useful, such JavaScript analyses need to be precise and
to run within a reasonable amount of time. However, JavaScript’s inherently dynamic
nature makes precise static analysis very expensive. As an anecdotal example, we have
observed a particular 2,800 line JavaScript program1 on which a sequential JavaScript
analysis that computes data and control dependencies takes over 22 hours to complete.
While in the early days of its introduction JavaScript programs tended to be small, sim-
1linq aggregate with stack-5-4
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ple scripts, today there are many complex JavaScript applications with tens to hundreds
of thousands of lines of code. Thus, there is a need to increase JavaScript analysis
performance while maintaining high levels of precision.
A heretofore unexplored option is to parallelize the JavaScript analysis, thus ex-
ploiting the prevalence of modern multicore architectures. The idea of parallel pro-
gram analysis is not novel; there are many existing parallel program analysis frame-
works [30, 61, 63, 103, 105, 113, 114, 121, 140]. However, most of these efforts are
aimed at first-order, statically-typed, highly imperative languages such as C or Fortran;
JavaScript presents new challenges that must be addressed. Our novelty lies not only
in the first parallel JavaScript static analysis, but also in the approach with which we
design our parallel analysis, which potentially could benefit parallel analysis of other
languages.
Key Insight. We focus on parallel analyses that are flow- and context-sensitive, be-
cause we need a high level of precision to successfully analyze JavaScript. Almost all
such precise parallel analyses in existing work are based on traditional dataflow anal-
ysis (DFA) [93, 100]. Our key insight is that the DFA framework inextricably mixes
decisions about synchronization and granularity with the definition of the analysis it-
self, thus limiting opportunities to fully exploit possible parallelism in such analyses.
We identify an alternate approach to program analysis more amenable to paralleliza-
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tion, based on ideas from abstract interpretation. Using this approach, we can phrase
an analysis as two separate and independent components:
• An abstract semantics that represents the static analysis as a state transition sys-
tem (STS). The analysis is defined as a reachable-states computation on the STS:
given a program and its initial state, the analysis finds all abstract program states
potentially reachable from that initial state. This reachable-states computation is
embarrassingly parallel in nature, because each state is inherently independent
from all other states.
• A separate mechanism for selectively merging multiple abstract states into a
single abstract state by over-approximating the information in the states being
merged together. This merging takes place during the reachability computation
and is used to bound the reachable state space in a sound manner. This mech-
anism effectively merges branches of the computation tree formed by the STS,
turning it into a DAG and thus adding sequential behavior (and synchronization
points) into the otherwise parallel reachable-states computation.
From this perspective the static analysis itself is trivially a massively parallel prob-
lem; this parallelism is then limited by a strategy that determines how and when states
are merged (introducing synchronization into the analysis). Using this approach, op-
portunities for parallelizing the analysis become more obvious than the previous DFA-
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based approaches. In fact, existing approaches can be re-defined as limited instances
of our framework. While it is possible to derive this overall insight purely from a DFA
standpoint, it is not possible to act upon it within the DFA framework because DFA
intertwines and conflates the two above-described components in an inseparable way.
Our new perspective provides a useful framework for designing parallel analyses,
but there is still a large design space to be explored. The strategy for merging states
controls the level of synchronization required by the analysis, as well as the size of the
state space being explored; thus it has a strong impact on parallelism. In addition, while
the normal reachable-states computation is embarassingly parallel, that does not nec-
essarily mean that taking full advantage of its inherent parallelism is the best course—
there are many different possible levels of granularity which may provide performance
benefits and tradeoffs.
In essence, in our approach the problem of parallelizing an analysis boils down to
two decisions: determining a strategy for merging states, and selecting a particular level
of granularity at which to operate. In this work we explore several such design points,
discussing their rationales and implications. We include a novel parallelization strategy
based on function contexts.
Contributions. The specific contributions of this work are the following:
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1. A new perspective on the design of parallel program analyses, based on formulat-
ing the analysis as a state transition system plus a separate state merging strategy.
(Section 5.3.1)
2. A language-agnostic exploration of the design space of this parallelization frame-
work, including a novel parallelization strategy based on function contexts. (Sec-
tion 5.3.2)
3. Our implementation of these ideas for JSAI, an abstract interpreter for JavaScript
that computes a fundamental analysis for JavaScript—performing a combination
of type inference, alias analysis, control-flow analysis, and string, numeric, and
boolean value analysis. (Section 5.4)
4. An evaluation of our resulting parallel JavaScript abstract interpreter. Speedups
are typically in the 2-4× range on 12 hardware threads, ranging as high as 36.9×
. (Section 6.6)
5. A publicly available implementation2.
2In the Downloads section of http://cs.ucsb.edu/˜pllab
105
Chapter 5. Improving Performance of Static Analysis via Parallelization
5.2 Background and Related Work
In this section we provide a brief background on sequential dataflow analysis (DFA)
and describe related work on parallelizing program analysis, much of which is based
on DFA.
5.2.1 Sequential Dataflow Analysis
DFA-based analysis is carried out on the program’s control-flow graph (CFG),
which is a directed graph G = 〈N,E〉 where N is a finite set of nodes corresponding
to program statements and E ⊆ N ×N is a set of edges corresponding to the possible
control-flow between statements. The possible analysis solutions are structured into a
lattice L = (Solns ,v,unionsq,u), where the most-precise solution is at the bottom ⊥ of the
lattice and the least-precise solution is at the top > of the lattice.3
Each node k of the CFG maintains two lattice elements corresponding to the anal-
ysis solutions immediately before and immediately after that statement: INk represents
the incoming solution, and OUTk represents the outgoing solution. At the beginning of
the analysis INk = OUTk = ⊥ for every k. Each node k has a transfer function Fk that
transforms INk to OUTk. For all nodes k, the analysis iteratively computes the following
two functions until the analysis reaches a fixpoint:
3This is actually opposite of the convention usually used by DFA, which reverses the lattice described
above; we do this to be consistent with the abstract interpretation convention used later in the chapter.
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INk =
⊔
x∈pred(k)
OUTx (5.1)
OUTk = Fk(INk) (5.2)
In other words, for each node merge the outgoing information from all immediate
predecessor nodes (using the lattice join operator) to get that node’s incoming solution,
and then apply that node’s transfer function to get that node’s outgoing solution. The
fixpoint computation is usually performed using a worklist. The worklist is initialized
to contain the program’s entry node; the analysis iteratively performs the following
actions until the worklist is empty (signaling the fixpoint has been reached): pop a
node k from the worklist; compute INk and OUTk; if OUTk is changed from its previous
value then put all successor nodes of k onto the worklist.
The Importance of Node Ordering. The order in which the worklist processes nodes
is irrelevant in terms of correctness, i.e., the analysis will compute the same solution
regardless of node ordering. However, it turns out to have significant impact on analysis
performance. Intuitively, a bad node ordering can cause paths in the CFG to be redun-
dantly recomputed many times. Suppose a node k is computed to have OUTk = `where
lattice element ` ∈ Solns , and this information is propagated by the worklist down the
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CFG paths starting from k. Later the worklist processes a node that is a predecessor to
k, causing k to be processed again, and now OUTk = `′ where ` v `′. Then this new in-
formation must be propagated down the CFG again, subsuming the previous solutions
along those paths. In the worst case those paths could be recomputed h times where h
is the height of the lattice. Thus, a good node ordering is important for performance.
5.2.2 Parallelizing Program Analysis
We categorize the related work on parallelizing flow- and context-sensitive program
analysis into three general approaches. We leave out work on parallelizing flow- or
context-insensitive analysis, such as that by Me´ndez-Lojo et al. [113, 114], Edvinsson
et al. [63], and Nagaraj et al. [122].
Worklist-Based Parallelism. This parallelization strategy operates by processing all
nodes currently enqueued on the analysis worklist in parallel. Dwyer et al. [61] discuss
a worklist-parallel implementation of the FLAVERS DFA toolset [60] for C. They start
a new thread for each node in a global worklist and each thread enqueues its result back
in that worklist. The authors report average speedups of 3.8× on 6–9 hardware threads.
However, the paper’s evaluation is problematic in two respects, making it difficult to
interpret the results: (1) the sequential analysis they compare against used an arbitrary
node ordering for the worklist, which in our experience can cause slow-downs from 2–
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5× relative to a more optimized node ordering strategy; and (2) their evaluation reports
analysis runtimes rather than speedups.4
Nondeterminism-Based Parallelism. This parallelization strategy looks for nonde-
terministic branch points in the analysis (e.g., conditional guards with indeterminate
truth values) and executes the branches in parallel until control-flow merges again (e.g.,
after the conditional is finished). This approach is taken by Monniaux [121], who
describes a parallel implementation of the Astre´e static analyzer [53] for embedded
controller code written in C. The parallel implementation exploits the fact that, in this
particular application domain, programs often contain dispatch loops over a switch
statement, and each case within the switch requires significant analysis effort and
is independent of all other cases. Thus each case is analyzed in parallel, achieving
speedups between 2–3× on five processors. The usefulness of this method is highly
specific both to C and to idioms common in the C programs that Astre´e targets. Mon-
niaux claims that a version for general-purpose programs was attempted which paral-
lelized at arbitrary nondeterministic points, and the results were dissappointing [121].
Partition-Based Parallelism. This parallelization strategy partitions the analysis in
some way and computes the analysis of each partition in parallel. This strategy is
extremely general, with a number of distinct instantiations in the literature.
4Speedups speak of both speed and scalability whereas runtimes tell us only about how fast something
went.
109
Chapter 5. Improving Performance of Static Analysis via Parallelization
Lee et al. [105, 106] partition their parallel Fortran analysis by strongly-connected
components (SCC) in the program’s CFG. Each SCC is analyzed in parallel using sepa-
rate worklists; the SCC solutions are combined using elimination-based techniques [126].
They achieve an average speedup of 4.6× in 8 threads. However, the speedups were
relative to their parallel analysis running on a single thread rather than to a specialized
sequential version of the analysis.
Weeks et al. [140] partition a parallel analysis for a custom purely-functional lan-
guage (used to write concurrent applications) using dynamically-discovered dependen-
cies. If statement s1 is found to be dependent on statement s2, then s1 will be put into
s2’s partition (unless this would increase s2’s partition size beyond some threshold).
The authors report runtimes, but we were able to compute speedup from the provided
data. These average 9.4× on 16 threads on two trivial benchmarks handcrafted by the
authors.
Albarghouthi et al’s parallel C analysis. [30] is query-based (i.e., they do not com-
pute a solution for the entire program, only enough to answer a specific query). They
frame the analysis in terms of MapReduce [56], with a parallel map phase and a se-
quential reduce phase. During the map phase, multiple functions are analyzed intrapro-
cedurally in parallel. If a function call is encountered, then the call is enqueued to be
analyzed later. During the reduce phase, sequential dependencies are accounted for.
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The process is repeated on the enqueued function calls until a fixpoint is reached. They
achieve an average speedup of 3.71× on 8 hardware threads.
5.2.3 Problems with the DFA Approach for Parallelism
A number of the existing approaches to parallelizing analysis, as described above,
require a CFG as input. For languages such as C and Fortran this is a reasonable as-
sumption; however, for a language like JavaScript it is not reasonable at all. Javascript’s
higher-order functions, prototype-based inheritance, implicit type conversions and im-
plicit exceptions, and other language features mean that a computing a useful CFG
requires extensive, precise, and costly analysis—the very kind of analysis we are trying
to optimize via parallelization.
In addition, the DFA approach itself can make it more difficult to see opportunities
for parallelization. The traditional formulation of DFA is inherently sequential. We
observe that equations (1) and (2) in Section 5.2.1 implicitly impose synchronization
points into the very definition of the analysis itself, as they require multiple nodes to
cooperate in order to merge and propagate information between themselves. Synchro-
nization is (almost) unavoidable for a tractable analysis, but the DFA framework makes
it difficult to separate synchronization out as a separate concern from the analysis itself.
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5.3 Designing for Parallelism
Our key insight is that by designing and implementing the program analysis in a
certain way, the design space of parallelization strategies becomes clearer and imple-
menting the parallelization strategies effectively becomes easier. In particular, we take
advantage of an approach to program anaysis based on abstract interpretation which we
call STSO; this approach divides the analysis into two separate components: an embar-
rassingly parallel reachability computation on a state transition system, and a strategy
for selectively merging states during that reachability computation. We describe this
program analysis approach below, and then discuss the parallelism design space ex-
posed by this anaysis perspective.
5.3.1 The STSO Approach to Program Analysis
The basis for the STSO approach to program analysis is described in [82]; we sum-
marize the approach in this section. Note that everything in this section refers to a
completely sequential definition of program analysis; there is no parallelism. Funda-
mentally, the STSO model specifies a static analysis in two parts: (1) the underlying
analysis itself, described as a state transition system (STS); and (2) a strategy for when
to merge states together, used to bound the reachable state space while maintaining the
soundness of the analysis.5 The solution to the analysis is the set of reachable states in
5As described in [82] this strategy is a widening operator O in the abstract interpretation sense.
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the STS from some given initial state; the state merging strategy specifies the control
flow sensitivity of the analysis, i.e., its path-, flow-, context-, and heap-sensitivity. Thus,
the analysis and its sensitivity are treated as two separate and independent concerns.
The key insight of this work, as opposed to [82], is that this separation of concerns can
greatly benefit parallelism in a way described in later sections of this chapter.
An abstract machine-based smallstep operational semantics is a useful way to de-
scribe a static analysis [138], and can easily be seen as a STS. Such a semantics defines
a notion of abstract state (e.g., a program point together with the current abstract values
of all variables in scope at that program point) and a set of transition rules that uses the
semantics of the program statement at that program point to map an abstract state to a
new abstract state. For example, if the abstract state is 〈pp3, [x 7→1]〉 and the statement
at program point 3 is “x += 1”, then the next state would be 〈pp4, [x 7→2]〉. The exact
definition of an abstract state and the transition rules would vary depending on the lan-
guage being analyzed and the analysis being defined. Without going into details on the
exact state definition and transition rules for a particular language and analysis, we can
formalize this idea as the following:
ςˆ ∈ Σ] abstract states
F ] ⊆ Σ] × Σ] transition relation
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The abstract states form a lattice L = (Σ],v,u,unionsq), where v is the ordering rela-
tion, u is the meet operator, and unionsq is the join operator. The solution to the program
analysis is defined as the least fixpoint (lfp) of the abstract semantics from some set
of initial states Σ]I . Define the operator ·˚ so that for set S and any function on sets F ,
F˚(S ) = S ∪ F(S ). Then the analysis solution JPK] for program P is defined by:
JPK] = lfpΣ]I F˚ ]
An operational view of this least fixpoint definition is as a worklist algorithm: it
initializes the worklist with the states in Σ]I , then iteratively it (1) removes the current
states from the worklist; (2) applies F ] to them to get a set of new states; (3) filters out
any states it has seen already; and (4) puts the remaining states into the worklist. This
continues until the worklist is empty, at which point it has computed the entire set of
possible states, thus concluding the program analysis.
However, the analysis as defined is intractable (in fact, potentially uncomputable).
The issue is control-flow—specifically, the nondeterministic choices that must be made
because of the analysis’ over-approximations: which branch of a conditional should
be taken, whether a loop should be entered or exited, which (indirect) function should
be called, etc. The number of abstract states grows exponentially with the number of
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nondeterministic choices, and is potentially unbounded. We must extend the analysis
to control this behavior.
Therefore, we apply a widening operator O to the analysis which bounds the ab-
stract state space by selectively merging abstract states, thus losing precision but mak-
ing the analysis tractable. This widening operator will, at each step of the fixpoint com-
putation: (1) partition the current set of reachable states into disjoint sets; (2) for each
partition, merge all of the abstract states in that partition into a single abstract state that
over-approximates the entire partition; (3) union the resulting abstract states together
into a new set that contains only a single abstract state per partition. This allows us to
limit the number of states by fixing a particular number of partitions. By defining differ-
ent strategies for partitioning the abstract states, we can control how states are merged
and thus control the precision and performance of the analysis. As shown in [82], this
partitioning strategy is actually synonymous with the analysis control flow sensitivity.
Operationally, this means that we modify the worklist algorithm so that it maintains
a memoization table with one entry (i.e., abstract state) per partition. At each step the
algorithm selects a state from the worklist, uses F ] to compute a new set of states,
merges them into the appropriate partition entries using O, and if any of those parti-
tion entries have changed due to the newly-merged information, adds them back into
the worklist. In pseudocode, this operational view of the STSO model looks like the
following:
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Example 4 The sequential worklist algorithm
put the initial abstract state ςˆ0 on the worklist
initialize map memo : Partition → State] to empty
repeat
remove an abstract state ςˆ from the worklist
for all abstract states ςˆ ′ in next states(ςˆ) do
if memo does not contain partition(ςˆ ′) then
memo(partition(ςˆ ′)) = ςˆ ′
put ςˆ ′ on worklist
else
ςˆold = memo(partition(ςˆ ′))
ςˆnew = ςˆold unionsq ςˆ ′
if ςˆnew 6= ςˆold then
memo(partition(ςˆ ′)) = ςˆnew
put ςˆnew on worklist
end if
end if
end for
until worklist is empty
The next states function applies the state transition rules to determine the next
abstract state(s) reachable from the given abstract state—this entails the computational
core of the analysis logic. The partition function maps an abstract state to its par-
tition as defined by the state merging strategy. The algorithm computes the analysis
fixpoint exactly as described earlier.
5.3.2 Parallelism Design Space
The STSO program analysis model provides a useful perspective for parallelizing
analysis, because it boils the problem down to two questions: (1) what strategy should
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we use to merge states during the reachability computation (thus injecting synchro-
nization points); and (2) what granularity should we use to parallelize the reachability
computation itself?
Recall that the state merging strategy is synonymous with the flow- and context-
sensitivity of the analysis—merging fewer states means greater sensitivity and thus
greater precision, while merging more states means less sensitivity and thus less pre-
cision. With respect to parallelization, there is a tradeoff between merging strategies
that merge fewer states (reducing synchronization but increasing the number reachable
states), versus strategies that merge fewer states (increase synchronization but reducing
the number of reachable states). We explore a small part of this space in our evaluation,
however, there is interesting future work in exploring this trade-off further.
Besides state merging, the remaining question is granularity, which we explore in
the rest of this section. We first discuss an obvious point in this space, the worklist-
parallel strategy, and why it is not a satisfactory solution. We then introduce a novel
point in this space, the per-context strategy, that has not been explored before.
Worklist-Parallel Strategy. The most straightforward granularity strategy is to par-
allelize the worklist loop by processing each node on the worklist in parallel. In essence,
we explore the reachability of each node independently until the various states reach
some merge point specified by the merge strategy (but not necessarily the same merge
117
Chapter 5. Improving Performance of Static Analysis via Parallelization
point for all states), whereupon the merged states are inserted back into the global work-
list for the process to be repeated. The pseudocode of the analysis for this strategy looks
like the following:
Example 5 The worklist parallel algorithm
put the initial abstract state ςˆ0 on the worklist
initialize templist to empty
initialize map memo : Partition → State] to empty
repeat
for all abstract states ςˆ in the worklist do in parallel
for all abstract states ςˆ ′ in next states(ςˆ) do
begin thread-safe
if memo does not contain partition(ςˆ ′) then
memo(partition(ςˆ ′)) = ςˆ ′
put ςˆ ′ on templist
else
ςˆold = memo(partition(ςˆ ′))
ςˆnew = ςˆold unionsq ςˆ ′
if ςˆnew 6= ςˆold then
memo(partition(ςˆ ′)) = ςˆnew
put ςˆnew on templist
end if
end if
end thread-safe
end for
end parallel for
swap worklist and templist
until worklist is empty
The thread-safe block is run atomically using synchronization primitives.
There are three major drawbacks to this strategy. First, it can cause a great deal of
redundant computation because of node ordering issues (as described in Section 5.2.1).
If multiple states are being processed in parallel but one subsumes the others, then
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the parallel computations are not actually useful and there is no gain in performance.
Second, all of the parallel computations must be synchronized together, even those that
reach different merge points (and hence are independent). This is because the analysis
doesn’t know which threads will reach which merge points, and thus must wait until all
threads reach some merge point before it can continue at any one merge point. Finally,
this strategy introduces a large number of short-lived threads, which can be detrimental
to performance.
Per-Context Parallel Strategy. We propose a novel point in the granularity design
space based on function contexts, one that attempts to address some of the issues of
the worklist-parallel strategy and is motivated by empirical observation. We want to
reduce node ordering issues, limit synchronization between independent parts of the
analysis, and increase the granularity of the thread computations. Context-sensitive
analyses have desirable properties which can be exploited for these goals. Context-
sensitive analyses clone functions based on some notion of abstract calling context (the
exact definition of “context” defines the particular type of context-sensitivity used by
the analysis). Each clone is specialized to a particular context and, most importantly,
analyzed separately. Different clones can be analyzed in parallel, while analysis of
a single clone can be done sequentially. This strategy allows a more optimal node
ordering, because within each context we can sequentially analyze nodes in reverse
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postorder (the best possible node ordering). Different contexts are independent of each
other, which limits synchronization. Finally, threads now compute an entire function
rather than a single statement or basic block, increasing work granularity per thread
and reducing thread management overhead. The pseudocode of the analysis using this
strategy is as follows:
In the above algorithm, a unique thread is used to run ANALYSISTHREAD per con-
text. The global map backlog maps each context to a synchronized queue, while
worklist is local to each thread. The function context extracts the context under
which an abstract state needs to be analyzed. Note that no synchronization is required
on access to memo (because each thread is run sequentially and multiple threads do not
access same parts of memo). The procedure PROCESS checks if no thread correspond-
ing to context is running, which can happen under two circumstances: (1) the context
has never been seen before, thus a new thread is used to run ANALYSISTHREAD with
that context (2) the thread corresponding to the context has marked itself as potentially
done, in which case the thread is unmarked and woken up back again to run ANALY-
SISTHREAD. The analysis begins by calling MAIN, and the analysis ends when each
of the threads mark themselves as potentially done and each of the backlog queues are
empty.
While a per-context strategy has been previously mentioned in the literature [63], to
our knowledge this is the first time it has ever been detailed and implemented. Addition-
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Example 6 The per-context parallel algorithm
procedure ANALYSISTHREAD(ctxt)
move abstract states from backlog(ctxt) to worklist
repeat
remove an abstract state ςˆ from the worklist
for all abstract states ςˆ ′ in next states(ςˆ) do
if context(ςˆ ′) 6= ctxt then
PROCESS(context(ςˆ ′), ςˆ ′)
else if memo does not contain partition(ςˆ ′) then
memo(partition(ςˆ ′)) = ςˆ ′
put ςˆ ′ on worklist
else
ςˆold = memo(partition(ςˆ ′))
ςˆnew = ςˆold unionsq ςˆ ′
if ςˆnew 6= ςˆold then
memo(partition(ςˆ ′)) = ςˆnew
put ςˆnew on worklist
end if
end if
end for
until worklist is empty
if backlog(ctxt) is empty then
mark this thread as potentially done
else
ANALYSISTHREAD(ctxt)
end if
end procedure
procedure PROCESS(ctxt, ςˆ)
begin thread-safe
enqueue ςˆ into backlog(ctxt)
if no thread corresponding to ctxt is running then
ANALYSISTHREAD(ctxt)
end if
end thread-safe
end procedure
procedure MAIN
initialize map memo : Partition → State] to empty
ANALYSISTHREAD(context(ςˆ0))
end procedure
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ally, thanks to the STSO representation of the analysis, using the per-context strategy is
simple. Instead of a global worklist, use one worklist per context encountered during
the analysis. Each worklist has a dedicated thread computing a fixpoint. When a thread
processes a function call leading to a new context, it passes the resulting state on to the
appropriate thread and continues processing its own worklist. The only synchronization
required is this thread communication. When all worklists are empty, the analysis has
reached a global fixpoint.
5.4 Parallel JavaScript Analysis
In this section we briefly describe the JavaScript language and the existing sequen-
tial JavaScript analysis that we adapted for our parallel analysis. We then describe the
modification to that sequential analysis necessary to implement our parallel analysis
design.
5.4.1 JavaScript Features
JavaScript is an imperative, dynamically-typed language with objects, prototype-
based inheritance, higher-order functions, implicitly applied type-conversions, and ex-
ceptions. JavaScript programs only have two scopes (global scope and function scope),
though variables and functions are allowed to be defined anywhere; these declara-
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tions (but not the corresponding initializations, except for functions) are automatically
hoisted to the appropriate scoping level. JavaScript is designed to be as resilient as
possible: when a program performs some action that doesn’t make sense (e.g., access-
ing a property of a non-object, or adding a boolean and a function together) JavaScript
uses implicit conversions and default behaviors when possible in order to continue the
execution without errors rather than raising an exception.
Objects are the fundamental JavaScript data structure.6 Object properties can be
dynamically inserted and deleted, and when performing a property access the specific
property being accessed can be computed at runtime. JavaScript features such as the
for..in loop and the in operator allow for reflective introspection of an object’s con-
tents. Object inheritance is handled via delegation: when accessing a property that is
not present in a given object obj, the property lookup algorithm determines whether
obj has some other object proto as its prototype; if so then the lookup is recursively
propagated to proto.
These features have two important implications for static analysis: (1) computing
a precise CFG requires careful and costly analysis, because higher-order functions,
prototype-based inheritance, implicit type-conversions, and implicit exceptions make
control-flow non-obvious, thus analysis techniques based on the CFG are problematic;
6Even functions and arrays are just special kinds of objects, and can be used in the same ways as
other objects.
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and (2) JavaScript’s inherent dynamism means that high precision is important to get
useful results, implying that any useful analysis will be expensive.
5.4.2 Sequential JSAI
We build on an existing sequential abstract interpreter for JavaScript called JSAI [96].
The analysis performs type inference, control-flow analysis, pointer analysis, and nu-
meric, string, and boolean value analysis. JSAI is designed and implemented as an
abstract machine-based smallstep operational semantics, which can be thought of as
a state transition system. Rather than baking in a specific flow-, context-, and heap-
sensitivity strategy, JSAI is designed around the STSO model in order to have config-
urable control flow sensitivity [82]: the basic analysis computes the reachable states of
the STS defined by the abstract semantics, while a separate modular component deter-
mines a strategy for selectively merging states. States are represented as tuples holding
relevant components such as the values on the stack and heap, the current continuation,
and a trace recording the execution history. The set of states forms a lattice; states are
merged using the lattice join operator which operates pointwise on the state compo-
nents. The choice of which states to merge and when is determined by JSAI’s merging
strategy, which can be chosen independently from the rest of the analysis. A given
merging strategy determines the flow-, context-, and heap-sensitivity of the analysis;
indeed, merging strategies and sensitivities are synonymous.
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JSAI is formally specified and the code is designed to have a close correspondence
with the formalisms, using immutable states and written using mostly pure functional
style, making it easy to follow and manipulate. Alternatively, we could have used
TAJS [87, 89, 90], a competing sequential JavaScript analysis framework, whose run-
times are in the same order of magnitude as JSAI (between 0.3× and 1.8×). However,
TAJS does not use the STSO model, does not offer configurable sensitivity, and lacks a
formal specification.
5.4.3 Parallelism Strategies
We implement two specific parallelism strategies as discussed in Section 5.3: the
worklist-parallel strategy and the per-context strategy. We describe for each one the
necessary changes to JSAI, which were minimal in both cases. Our experience is that
implementing different strategies is a simple task, making it easy to explore the design
space of the STSO model. For each strategy we use a single global thread pool [15, 35]
of a fixed size and create new thread tasks for the pool on demand. We also replace
JSAI’s memoization table (which holds the computed solution as the analysis executes,
mapping program points to the abstract states computed at that program point so far)
with a thread-safe version that requires no locking for table lookups [16].
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Worklist-Parallel Strategy. This strategy is the simplest to implement. Rather than
iteratively popping elements off of the worklist and processing them sequentially, in-
stead we pop all elements of the worklist and process each element in parallel, having
them enqueue the resulting abstract states back onto the global worklist. This strategy
is, in concept, the same strategy used by Dwyer et al [61], and we implement it to use
as a comparison point for our novel proposed strategy given below.
Per-Context Parallel Strategy. We observe that for the JavaScript benchmarks we
have tested, if N states are on a non-empty worklist, and those N states are members
of M contexts (where 1 ≤ M ≤ N ), then typically M >> 1. In other words, many
contexts are typically enqueued for processing at once. This indicates that the per-
context strategy described in Section 5.3 has promise for anayzing JavaScript. Instead
of a global worklist, we use one worklist per context, with one thread for each work-
list. Each worklist has an associated non-blocking, lock-free [17, 116] backlog queue
that other threads use to enqueue work for that thread; whenever a thread runs out of
elements in its worklist, it puts its backlog queue into its worklist and continues. When
a thread processes a function call that belongs to a new context, it puts the resulting ab-
stract state into that context’s backlog queue. The analysis has reached a fixpoint when
all worklists and backlog queues are empty. The memoization table is global; because
contexts are independent from each other, there will never be a conflict between threads
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when updating the memoization table. We also tried an alternative to the backlog queue
strategy for thread communication, wherein threads directly enqueued work into other
threads’ worklists; we saw results ranging from 30% faster to 18% slower performance
relative to the backlog queue implementation, with most benchmarks being slower; thus
we only use the backlog queue implementation in our evaluation.
5.5 Evaluation
We evaluate our parallel JSAI implementation using a set of real-world JavaScript
benchmarks, detailed in Section 5.5.2. We decribe the benchmarks and our experimen-
tal methodology, then present and discuss our results for the worklist-parallel strategy
and the per-context strategy.
5.5.1 Experimental Methodology
System Under Test. Our testbed is equipped with two 6-core Intel Xeon processors
running at 1.9 Ghz with hyperthreading enabled. We only report data for 1-12 threads,
with one thread per core. While utilizing hyperthreading with 13-24 threads usually
did yield better speedups, these tended to be minimal and with high variability. The
machine is equipped with a total of 32 GB of memory, and we ran with a maximum
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JVM heap size of 25,600 MB for all experiments. During the course of the experiments,
we had exclusive access to the machine, and all non-essential services were disabled.
Calculating Speedups. The speedups we report are relative to the sequential JSAI
implementation, as per the usual definition of speedup. This is an important point
for comparing against related work. In several cases, authors have instead focused
on runtimes [140], speedups relative to the framework itself [105, 106, 114], percent
improvement in performance [103], or atypical presentations of speedups [121].
Configuration Focus. Previous experiments [96] have shown that stack-based CFA
tends to work well for JavaScript, both in terms of precision and performance. We
specifically use stack-k-h CFA, in which the top k callsites on the call stack are
used as the context (this is the standard “callstring context sensitivity” used in DFA).
The parameter h controls the heap sensitivity, which distinguishes each abstract object
allocation by a context of depth h, in addition to its program location. We show results
for stack-5-4 (most precise) in this section.
Testing. In order to test the correctness of our implementation, we annotated the
benchmarks with special statements to print out the final abstract values for certain
program points. In all cases, the solutions from our parallel implementation were equiv-
alent to the solutions produced by the sequential interpreter. In addition, we ran several
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hundred handcrafted tests on both the sequential and parallel analyzers to compare their
results; in all cases they agree.
5.5.2 Benchmarks
We focus on ECMA3-compliant JavaScript programs which do not exercise the doc-
ument object model (DOM). While SunSpider and other concrete performance bench-
mark suites meet the above criteria, most of their constituents complete analysis within
seconds. Given that short-running benchmarks can be improved little by the addition
of parallelism, such benchmarks have been omitted from our evaluation.
In an attempt to derive more complex benchmarks which are more time-consuming
for our analysis to handle, we have turned to open source JavaScript programs in the
wild. This allows us to benchmark against a more realistic suite. Additionally, we have
intentionally selected benchmarks representing a variety of coding styles, with both
imperative and functional code. This allows us to determine whether or not our paral-
lel analysis performance is dependent on coding style, which is important considering
that JavaScript allows for very different styles to be used and to coexist. A complete
description of our benchmark suite is given in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Worklist-parallel speedups for the trace stack-5-4. The number of
hardware threads used is on the x axis, and the speedup is on the y axis.
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Figure 5.2: Per-context parallel speedups for the trace stack-5-4. The number of
hardware threads used is on the x axis, and the speedup is on the y axis.
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5.5.3 Worklist-Parallel Results
The performance results for the worklist-parallel strategy on the configuration stack-5-4
is given in Figure 5.1. Under stack-5-4 the worklist-parallel results show real
promise with the linq aggregate and linq functional benchmarks. Both linq aggregate
and linq functional benchmarks show superlinear speedup for less than 10 hard-
ware threads. The superlinear speedup seems to be the result of two factors. First, both
the linq aggregate and linq functional benchmarks are highly functional in
implementation style, containing more than one function per ten lines of code. More-
over, many of these functions are used in a higher-order style, are largely independent
of each other, and are of small to moderate length. Intuitively, this leads to many con-
texts of a granularity level well-suited to parallel processing. Second, node ordering
is also probably a factor. The sequential analyzer enforces an arbitrary, possibly far-
from-optimal ordering between states in different contexts (it uses reverse post-order
within a context, but without the results of the analysis it isn’t possible to order be-
tween contexts). It is possible that our worklist-parallel implementation just happens
to choose better node orderings on these benchmarks. The somewhat erratic nature of
our speedup curves serves as further evidence of these ordering issues. It is unclear
how to measure the effects of ordering in a structured way, therefore, we do not have
any experiments that can backup our conjecture. There are many examples from the
literature where either superlinear or otherwise better than predicted performance has
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been recorded [30, 61, 63, 105], and different node orderings were commonly cited as
the reason.
In stark contrast to the excellent speedups of linq aggregate and linq functional
on stack-5-4, the rest of the benchmarks see rather dismal performance. No other
benchmark was able to reach a speedup higher than 1.45×, irrespective of the number
of hardware threads used. This implies that for these benchmarks, the worklist-parallel
approach duplicates a significant amount of work. One exception to this seems to be
linq action, which was derived from the same codebase as linq aggregate
and linq functional. Given that linq action has a fairly short sequential run-
time at around 32 seconds, it seems that it is simply too short to see much improvement
from the worklist-parallel strategy.
5.5.4 Per-Context Parallel Results
Speedups for the per-context parallel implementation with our stack-5-4 trace
on our benchmark suite are shown in Figure 5.2. Once again, linq aggregate and
linq functional stand out, unconditionally showing higher speedups in all cases
than any other benchmark. Moreover, both benchmarks show superlinear behavior
for less than 10 hardware threads, presumably for the same reasons as detailed in the
previous section. Of particular interest is that based on the performance results, it
appears that there are three buckets in which data can be distributed based on their
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relative performance to each other. This bucketing shows that functional programs tend
to perform better than non-functional programs, with all of our functional benchmarks
being either in the top-performing or moderate-performing bucket. However, this is not
to say that non-functional programs can not perform well; the moderately-performing
bucket holds cryptobench, a highly imperative benchmark.
With the trend of functional programs generally performing better, speedups under-
neath stack-5-4 in Figure 5.2 is particularly interesting. The linq aggregate
and linq functional benchmarks both show superlinear speedup, with linq aggregate
seeing speedups higher than 34× on 10 cores. linq aggregate shows strong ev-
idence that node ordering is to blame, given the sudden drop in performance at 8
hardware threads under stack-5-4. It seems likely that the sequential interpreter
chooses a particularly poor context ordering for linq aggregate underneath the
stack-5-4 trace. This same sort of performance drop is also seen with the numbers
benchmark underneath stack-5-4. As such, context ordering plays a significant role,
even for the parallel abstract interpreter.
5.6 Conclusions
We have presented a alternative program analysis model to the more usual DFA
approach, called STSO. This framework makes it easy to reason about and explore
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different parallelization strategies, as well as being more applicable than DFA to lan-
guages with difficult control-flow that make the program CFG hard to compute. Us-
ing this framework we have implemented a parallel analysis for JavaScript and ex-
plored two points in the parallel design space: a naive worklist-parallel strategy and
a novel per-context strategy. Our results show that our parallel implementation pro-
vides speedups comparable or better than the speedups reported in our related work for
realistic JavaScript programs.
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Application of JSAI to Security of
JavaScript-based Browser Addons
6.1 Introduction
The web-browser addon framework is a powerful and popular mechanism for ex-
tending browser behavior—thousands of third-party developers are creating addons,
and browser users have downloaded billions of copies [23]. These addons have al-
most complete access to a user’s information: browser history, cookies, passwords,
clipboard, geo-location, mouse and keyboard actions, the local filesystem, and more.
Malicious addons are trivially easy to write, and yet can be difficult to detect. Thus,
vetting third-party addons is critical both for users (whose information is at risk) and for
browser providers (whose reputations are at risk). However, the current vetting process
for addons submitted to official addon repositories is mostly manual and completely
ad-hoc.
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Our goal is to help automate this vetting process by creating an analysis to auto-
matically infer security signatures for JavaScript-based browser addons. A security
signature captures both (1) information flows between interesting sources and sinks,
for example, from the current browser URL to a network message; and (2) interesting
API usage, for example, to detect deprecated or unsafe APIs. API usage inference is
treated as a special case of information flow—in essence, can any information poten-
tially flow to a use of that API. This signature inference analysis can be used by official
addon repositories upon addon submission (and also by third-party developers prior to
submission) to detect potential security problems, thus reducing the vetting burden and
increasing addon security.
6.1.1 Key Challenges
We must address three key challenges to enable security analysis of browser addons:
1. Flexible Security Policies: Naively, we might expect to use a standard infor-
mation flow analysis [127] to establish the security of an addon. For such an
analysis, we would use a security lattice to specify a security policy describing
allowable information flows, and report any information flows in the addon that
violate the specified policy. Unfortunately, there is no single security policy (and
hence no single security lattice) that is suitable for all addons. Whether an ad-
don’s information flow is secure or not depends largely on that addon’s intended
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purpose. For example, the current URL being browsed by the user should usu-
ally be private. However, if an addon’s intended purpose is send URLs over the
network to an URL shortener service, then this information flow is expected and
allowed. There are many other examples of information flows that would usually
be considered insecure, but that are allowable given the intended purpose of the
addon. Thus, we need a more flexible solution than traditional information flow
analysis.
2. Classifying Information Flows: Traditional information flow analysis simply
reports whether a leak (a flow violating the given security policy) might occur.
However, this information alone is not useful for our purpose—there are many
possible ways for information flow to happen, with varying levels of importance
and concern. We must be able to classify the information flows to aid the addon
vetter in their task and enable them to understand exactly what the addon is doing.
This requires a more discriminating analysis than traditional information flow.
3. Inferring Network Domains: A large part of addon security concerns the net-
work domains that the addon communicates with. In JavaScript, these domains
are created and passed around in the form of strings. It requires careful and pre-
cise analysis to recover the actual network domains from these strings.
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6.1.2 Our Contributions
To meet these challenges, we present the following contributions:
1. Annotated Program Dependence Graph: We base our analysis on the Pro-
gram Dependence Graph (PDG) [66]. Defining and implementing a PDG for
JavaScript is novel; moreover, we extend the classic definition with a novel set of
graph annotations that allow us to classify various information flows according
to their natures. We use the annotated PDG specifically for information flow in
this work, but it can be more generally useful, e.g., for program slicing, code
obfuscation, code compression, and various code optimizations. The annotated
PDG definition and construction algorithm are described in Section 6.3.
2. Security Signatures: To accomodate the fluid nature of addon security policies,
we develop a novel notion of addon security signatures. Rather than attempting
to enforce a specific policy, instead we infer interesting flows and API usages
and present them to the vetter, allowing them to compare the inferred signature
against the addon description to decide whether the addon should be accepted.
We define what constitutes a signature and how to construct a signature from the
annotated PDG. The definition of security signatures and their construction are
described in Section 6.4.
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3. Prefix String Analysis: Inferring network domains from strings requires precise
analysis, but that analysis must also remain tractable. We have defined a sweet-
spot in this space by developing a prefix string analysis that is precise enough to
compute most of the statically-determinable network domains while still retain-
ing practical performance. This analysis is described in Section 6.5.
4. Evaluation: Finally, we evaluate the usefulness and practicality of our work by
inferring security signatures for a set of ten real browser addons taken from the
Mozilla Firefox offical addon repository. The evaluation and results are described
in Section 6.6.
6.2 Background
In this section we provide necessary background information on addons, as well as
illustrative examples (taken from real addons) of how addons can violate user privacy.
Addon Security Context Modern web-browsers offer the ability to extend browser
behavior with user-installed addons (also called extensions). Addons1 are written in
JavaScript by third-party developers; they have much higher privileges than client-side
JavaScript programs, and they are not subject to the sandboxing and other security re-
1Extensions to browsers written in native code are referred to as browser plugins, and they are not the
focus of our work.
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strictions that exist for client-side programs. Proof-of-concept malicious addons have
been developed that demonstrate how easily such privileges can be misused [24, 25],
and other researchers have demonstrated that even non-malicious addons can be ex-
ploited to break security [40,108]. These are not just theoretical problems; for example,
the Mozilla vetting team has seen a number of submitted addons that contain malicious
code copied from these published exploits [32].
Addon Execution Addons use an event-driven programming model: they continu-
ously execute a loop responding to events such as mouse movement and clicks, key-
board entry, page loads, network responses, timeouts, etc. When the browser first starts
up the addon code is fully evaluated, during which a set of event handlers are registered.
Then the addon enters an loop in which the following two steps are executed infinitely
often: (1) if the event queue is not empty, then an event is pulled off the event queue;
(2) if there is an event handler corresponding to the given event, then the handler is in-
voked and evaluated to completion. More event handlers can be registered and existing
handlers can be de-registered during the event handling phase.
Addon Vetting The current addon vetting process for official addon repositories em-
ploys volunteers who manually inspect addon code. There are no fully documented
or precisely specified security policies, rather, the vetters look for “code smells”. Any
addon that does not pass the sniff test is rejected. Dynamic code injection is particu-
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larly discouraged, given the difficulty in statically determining what the dynamically-
injected code will do. This fact is encouraging for static analysis, because unlike client-
side JavaScript (which uses eval and related APIs heavily) we can safely disallow ad-
dons from using dynamic code. Our analysis reports any potential use of these restricted
APIs.
Privacy Leaks An addon’s elevated privileges make it trivial to leak private user
information. We concern ourselves with two kinds of information flows: explicit flows
(due to data dependencies) and implicit flows (due to control dependencies). Timing
and termination flows are beyond the scope of this work. We give two examples derived
from actual information flows discovered by our analysis in real addons that have been
downloaded millions of times. In these examples, the current URL being browsed
by the user is accessed by the addon via content.location.href, and the call
XHRWrapper(publicServer) sets up a cross site request to the network domain
publicServer. Consider the code:
function ajax(params) {
var data = params["data"];
request = XHRWrapper(publicServer);
request.send("url is: " + data);
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}
ajax({ data: content.location.href });
Here, the current URL is used to construct the data field of an object literal passed
as an argument to ajax. The function ajax creates a network request to publicServer
over which the data field of its formal parameter is sent, thus explicitly leaking the pri-
vate URL information. Now consider the code:
window.addEventListener("load", check, false);
function check(e) {
var seen = false;
if (content.location.href == "sensitive.com")
seen = true;
var request = XHRWrapper(publicServer);
request.send(seen);
}
Here check is registered as an event handler for page load events, thus, when-
ever the user loads a new page check is executed. check sets seen to true only
if the current URL is sensitive.com, and then sends seen over the network to
publicServer. This code implicitly leaks private information about whether the user
visits sensitive.com.
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These are just two—certainly non-exhaustive—ways in which privacy can be breached
by addons. Our main goal in this work is to develop a static analysis for JavaScript
addons that can reliably and precisely detect these kinds of privacy leaks, as well as
distinguish between various kinds of leaks.
6.3 Annotated PDGs for JavaScript
A Program Dependence Graph (PDG) [31, 38, 66] is an explicit representation of a
program’s data and control dependencies. We use an novel extended variant of PDGs as
a basis for our security signature inference (described in Section 6.4). The relation be-
tween information flow and program dependencies has been noted before (e.g., Abadi
et al [29]) and has previously been exploited for information flow analysis of Java byte-
code [80]. Our novel contributions are (1) defining PDG construction for JavaScript;
and (2) a set of annotations for the PDG that allow us to classify the various types of
information flows found in a program.
We assume we are given a base analysis for JavaScript that is flow- and context-
sensitive and computes a reduced product of pointer analysis (what objects a reference
may point to), string analysis (what set of strings a value may represent), and control-
flow analysis (what functions a call may refer to). Any such base analysis can be used
for our technique; two existing analyses that meet these requirements are JSAI [96]
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and TAJS [89]. From this information we compute the following as input to our PDG
construction:
1. A context-sensitive interprocedural control flow graph (CFG), with one node per
statement per context.
2. Read and write sets for each statement under each context, consisting of the set
of variables and the set of (object, property) pairs that the statement may read
from or write to. JavaScript uses computable property accesses, i.e., an object
property name is a string that can be computed at runtime, unlike languages such
as Java where object fields are statically known. Therefore, the object properties
in the read/write sets are actually abstract strings (elements from the abstract
string domain used in the base analysis) representing potentially multiple possible
concrete property names.
In the rest of this section, we explain how to use this information to construct an an-
notated PDG. We first define the annotated PDG, then describe the two stages of PDG
construction: constructing the annotated data dependence graph (DDG) and construct-
ing the annotated control dependence graph (CDG).
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6.3.1 Defining the Annotated PDG
A classic PDG is a graph (V,E) such that v ∈ V are the program statements and
there is an edge v1 → v2 ∈ E if there is a data or control dependence from v1 to v2.
Statement v2 is data dependent on statement v1 if v1 writes to a location in memory, v2
reads from that location in memory, and the value read by v2 could potentially be the
value written by v1. Statement v2 is control dependent on statement v1 if the execution
of v1 controls the number of times that v2 is executed (e.g., v1 is the guard of a condi-
tional and v2 is contained in one branch of that conditional). Information can flow from
statement v1 to statement v2 if there is a path in the PDG from v1 to v2.
In order to classify information flows, we annotate the edges of the PDG to denote
how each particular edge was derived from the program. We can broadly classify edges
based on whether they correspond to data or control dependencies, but an even finer
granularity of classification is useful. We describe and motivate the different possible
annotations here.
Data Dependence Annotations We can classify data dependence edges as strong
or weak. A strong data dependence arises between v1 and v2 if v1 writes to a single
memory location, v2 definitely reads from that exact same memory location, and the
value it reads is definitely the value written by v1. A weak data dependence arises
between v1 and v2 if either v2 only possibly reads from the same memory location as v1
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writes to, or if that memory location was possibly over-written by another value during
the execution between v1 and v2. The idea behind this classification is that information
flow along strong data dependence edges is more likely to be interesting/relevant than
that along weak data dependence edges.
Control Dependence Annotations We can classify control dependence edges as lo-
cal or non-local. We can further subdivide non-local control edges into explicit or
implicit. A local control edge arises from structured local control flow, such as condi-
tionals or loops; all other control edges are classified to be non-local. An explicit non-
local control edge arises from explicit (i.e., syntactically visible) control-flow jumps
in the code, such as a break or continue instruction inside a loop, or an exception
thrown using the throw instruction, or returning from a function using a return in-
struction. An implicit non-local control edge arises from implicit (i.e., syntactically
invisible) exceptions that can be thrown by various JavaScript instructions (e.g., ac-
cessing a property of the undefined value, or attempting to call a non-function). It is
useful to distinguish these categories; for example, consider line 20 in Figure 6.1, and
suppose that the analysis infers obj to be potentially undefined at this line. Since
this statement may raise an implicit exception, the statement at line 21 and all the state-
ments that follow inside the try block are control dependent on the conditional on line
19 (because the conditional evaluation of statement 19 dictates whether or not these
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statements execute), causing many additional edges to be added to the PDG. Most of
these additional edges are a gross over-approximation of the actual control-flow during
program execution. Thus, information flow along local control edges is likely to be
more interesting/relevant than that along non-local control edges, and information flow
along explicit non-local control edges are in turn likely to be more interesting/relevant
than that along implicit non-local control edges.
Amplified Control Finally, we can also classify control edges (independently from
the classifications above) as amplified or unamplified. An amplified control edge is
contained within a cycle of the CFG, whereas an unamplified control edge is not. This
is interesting for information flow because an unamplified control edge can convey at
most one bit of information (i.e., whether a statement is executed or not), whereas an
amplified control edge could potentially convey an arbitrary number of bits of informa-
tion (one for each iteration of the loop or recursive call).
Annotation Grammar From these various classifications, we define the following
annotation grammar:
149
Chapter 6. Application of JSAI to Security of JavaScript-based Browser Addons
ann ∈ Annotation ::= data | control
data ∈ DataDep ::= datastrong | dataweak
control ∈ CtrlDep ::= ctrl | ctrlamp
ctrl ∈ Ctrl ::= local | nonlocexp | nonlocimp
The annotated PDG is then a graph (V,E) such that v ∈ V are the program state-
ments and there is an edge v1
ann−−→ v2 ∈ E if there is a data or control dependence
from v1 to v2 that matches the criteria of annotation ann. The remaining subsections
describe how we construct the PDG and assign the appropriate annotations to its edges.
6.3.2 Constructing the Annotated DDG
The first phase of PDG construction creates the Data Dependence Graph, which
contains all of the data dependence edges of the eventual PDG. In JavaScript, data
dependencies arise from reads and writes to variables and to object properties. For
statement v, let ReadVar(v) be the set of variables that v can read from, ReadProp(v)
be the set of (object, property) pairs that v can read from, WriteVar(v) be the set of
variables that v can write to, and WriteProp(v) be the set of (object, property) pairs
that v can write to; these sets are computed from the base analysis described earlier.
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Dynamically adding, updating, or deleting a property are all considered object property
writes. Recall that the properties in these (object, property) pairs are actually abstract
strings representing possibly multiple concrete property names.
Each element of these sets is qualified as strong (a definite read or write) or weak
(a possible read or write). Definite reads/writes occur for a variable when its associated
abstract memory location is guaranteed to correspond to a single concrete memory lo-
cation. Definite reads/writes occur for a (object, property) pair when a similar criterion
holds for the object and the property abstract string corresponds to a single, exact con-
crete string. Note that definite writes correspond to strong updates in static analysis,
and thus write sets that are qualified to be strong are singleton sets. We use normal
set intersection for the ReadVar(·) and WriteVar(·) sets, but for the ReadProp(·) and
WriteProp(·) sets we must define a new set intersection operator that accounts for the
abstract string property names (which abstractly represent sets of concrete strings). We
define the operator e as: S1 e S2 = {(obj , prop) | (obj , prop1) ∈ S1, (obj , prop2) ∈
S2, prop = prop1 u prop2 , prop 6= ⊥}.
There is a DDG edge v1
datastrong−−−−−→ v2 if there is a CFG path from v1 to v2 and both
of the following conditions hold:
• WriteVar(v1) ∩ ReadVar(v2) = {var} and var is strong in both sets, or
WriteProp(v1) ∩ ReadProp(v2)
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= {(obj , prop)} and (obj , prop) is strong in both sets. In other words, v2 defi-
nitely reads from the memory location written by v1.
• There is no statement v3 along any path from v1 to v2 such that WriteVar(v1) ∩
WriteVar(v3) 6= ∅ or WriteProp(v1) eWriteProp(v3) 6= ∅, i.e., the value read
by v2 is definitely the value written by v1.
There is a DDG edge v1
dataweak−−−−−→ v2 if there is a CFG path from v1 to v2, there is not
an edge v1
datastrong−−−−−→ v2, and both of the following conditions hold:
• WriteVar(v1) ∩ ReadVar(v2) 6= ∅ or WriteProp(v1) e ReadProp(v2) 6= ∅. In
other words, v2 possibly reads from the memory location written by v1.
• There at least one path from v1 to v2 such that for any statement v3 on that path,
WriteVar(v1) ∩WriteVar(v3) is empty or contains only weak elements and
WriteProp(v1) e WriteProp(v3) is empty or contains only weak elements. In
other words, the value read by v2 is possibly the value written by v1.
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 give an example program and the associated PDG to il-
lustrate these points. The edge 1
datastrong−−−−−→ 2 exists because we can determine definitely
that the call argument at line 2 refers to the (object, property) pair created at line 1. The
edge 1 dataweak−−−−−→ 3 exists because (assuming the analysis cannot exactly determine the
return value of getString) we don’t know which property of the object defined at line
1 is being accessed.
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1 var data = { url: doc.loc };
2 send(data.url);
3 send(data[getString()]);
4 func();
5 if (doc.loc == "secret.com")
6 send(null);
7 var arr = ["covert.com", "priv.com"/*,...*/];
8 var i = 0, count = 0;
9 while(arr[i] && doc.loc != arr[i]) {
10 i++;
11 count++; } // end while
12 send(count);
13 try {
14 if (doc.loc != "hush-hush.com")
15 throw "irrelevant";
16 send(null);
17 } catch(x) {};
18 try {
19 if (doc.loc != "mystic.com")
20 obj.prop = 1;
21 send(null);
22 /* ..... */
23 } catch(x) {}
Figure 6.1: An example program to show the various annotations of the PDG. We as-
sume the following for this example: doc.loc is the current browser url; the send
method sends it arguments over the network; the base analysis infers obj to either
reference an object or null; func is inferred to be either a callable function or
undefined; and the call to getString() returns an unknown string.
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1
2 3
5
6
9
11
12
14
16
20
21
datastrong dataweak
local localamp
localamp
dataweak
nonlocexp nonlocimp
Figure 6.2: A subset of the annotated PDG for the example program in Figure 6.1, to
illustrate the interesting edges and nodes.
6.3.3 Constructing the Annotated CDG
The final phase of PDG construction creates the Control Dependence Graph (CDG);
the PDG is the union of the DDG and CDG. The CDG is constructed using standard
techniques [66], but we stage its construction in order to properly annotate the CDG
edges. We also omit from the CDG all edges due to uncaught exceptions (for example,
in Figure 6.1, we omit edges due to a potential implicit exception at line 4). If we
included those edges, then for all statements that may throw an exception outside of a
try/catch block we would need an edge to every other reachable statement in the CFG.
For our purposes omitting these edges is sound because uncaught exceptions result in
termination, and we are not considering termination leaks in our security analysis.
We construct the annotated CDG in four stages in the following order:
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1. Create a pruned CFG by removing all edges arising from non-local control-flow
(i.e., exceptions and jumps). Compute CDG1 from the pruned CFG using stan-
dard techniques, and annotate all edges with local.
2. Create another pruned CFG from the original CFG by removing all non-local
control-flow edges arising from implicit exceptions. Compute CDG2 from this
pruned CFG, subtract any edges present in CDG1, and annotate all remaining
edges with nonlocexp .
3. Compute CDG3 from the full CFG, subtract any edges present in CDG1 or CDG2,
and annotate all remaining edges with nonlocimp .
4. Update all three CDGs so that any annotation ctrl for an edge whose source
node is contained within a CFG cycle is updated to ctrlamp . The final CDG is
CDG1 ∪ CDG2 ∪ CDG3.
When creating a pruned CFG some nodes may become unreachable from the CFG
entry node; we add a new edge in the pruned CFG from the entry to any such node
before computing the CDG.
In the previous example, the edge 5 local−−→ 6 exists because line 6’s execution de-
pends on line 5 but there is no loop, and 9 local
amp−−−−−→ 11 exists because line 11’s execution
depends on line 9 and there is a containing loop. Line 16’s execution is control depen-
dent on line 14, because along its true branch, the explicit non local control flow at
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line 15 can cause line 16 to not execute. Hence the edge 14
nonlocexp−−−−−→ 16. Line 20 can
potentially throw an implicit exception, because the base analysis is assumed to infer
obj to either be a reference an object or null. Hence the edge 20
nonlocimp−−−−−→ 21.
6.4 Generating Security Signatures
From the annotated PDG described in the previous section, we can infer interesting
information flows to report to the addon vetter and classify them according to types
based on the annotations. In this section we describe the form of the signature and how
we infer signatures from the annotated PDG.
6.4.1 Description of Security Signatures
Figure 6.3 gives the formal description of a security signature. A signature consists
of zero or more entries, where each entry describes either a particular information flow
from an interesting source to an interesting sink, or an interesting API usage. API usage
is a special case of information flow that indicates there exists some source (interesting
or not) that may flow to an instance of that API. The set of interesting sources, sinks,
and APIs is given to the analysis; in our implementation we have used the sources,
sinks, and APIs considered interesting by the Mozilla vetting team (where the interest-
ing APIs include various script injection APIs such as Services.scriptloader and
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sign ∈ Signature ::= −−−→entry
entry ∈ Entry ::= src type−−→ sink | sink
type ∈ FlowType ::= type1 | . . . | type8
src ∈ Source ::= url | key | geoloc | . . .
sink ∈ Sink ::= send(Pre) | scriptloadr | . . .
Figure 6.3: Grammar for a security signature sign. Pre is the prefix string domain
described in Section 6.5; it is used to indicate the network domain being communicated
with. We give a subset of the complete list of interesting sources and sinks. The eight
flow types are described in the text and Figure 6.4.
various deprecated APIs), but they are easily configurable if desired. The send sink
(corresponding to a network send using XMLHttpRequest) takes a parameter indicat-
ing the network domain being communicated with. Each information flow entry also
has one of eight types, described further below.
An information flow between source and sink is derived from a path in the PDG
from the source to the sink. The type of flow is derived from the annotations on the
PDG edges along that path. We order the flow types by the kinds of edges (i.e., edges
with particular annotations) we allow the associated flow to traverse in the PDG: the
more kinds of edges allowed, the weaker the flow type. We have structured the set of
flow types into a lattice, pictured in Figure 6.4. Each flow type is associated with an
annotation from Annotation; the meaning is that a flow of a given type only traverses
PDG edges annotated with the given annotation or some annotation at a higher level in
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type1 (datastrong)
type2 (dataweak )
type3 (localamp)
type4 (local) type5
(
nonlocampexp
)
type6 (nonlocexp) type7
(
nonlocampimp
)
type8 (nonlocimp)
Figure 6.4: Flow types ordered in a lattice of perceived strength. Higher in the lattice
indicates a more important type of flow. Each flow type is associated with an annotation
from the PDG. A flow has a given type if there is a path from source to sink using only
PDG edges annotated with any annotation at a level equal or higher in the lattice.
the lattice. This lattice is based on our perceived strength of the type of flow—obtained
by manually examining the commonly intended and commonly accidental kinds of
flows. This lattice is the one we use in our analysis, but the lattice is independently
configurable to accommodate changes in perceived strength of the flow types.
Consider the examples below to better interpret the various flow types in the lattice
in the Figure 6.4. The strongest flow type, type1, is assigned to information flows that
only traverse PDG edges annotated with datastrong . The type4 flow type is assigned to
information flows that only traverse PDG edges annotated with local, localamp , dataweak , or
datastrong . The weakest flow type, type8, is assigned to information flows that traverse
any kind of PDG edge. One can think of a particular flow type as corresponding to a
sub-graph of the PDG containing only the allowed kinds of edges; an information flow
158
Chapter 6. Application of JSAI to Security of JavaScript-based Browser Addons
is assigned that flow type if (1) there is a path from the source to the sink contained in
that sub-graph; and (2) there is not a path from the source to the sink in the sub-graph
of any higher flow type.
6.4.2 Inferring Signatures
Given an annotated PDG, we must infer signatures of the form described above.
Inferring the API usage part of a signature (i.e., is there any information flow to an
interesting API) is straightforward: if there a reachable call statement in the CFG whose
call expression is data dependent on any node (including itself) with a ReadProp(·) set
containing a designated interesting sink snk, then the snk API may be used. Note that
for inferring API usage we consider all call expressions that are data dependent on reads
to APIs because functions can be copied and passed around in JavaScript. Inferring the
information flow entries of the signature is more involved; the rest of this subsection
explains how this is done.
We wish to characterize the set of paths between interesting sources and sinks with
a flow type. For each (source, sink) pair there is a set of paths between them in the PDG;
we need to compute the strongest flow type(s) possible that are consistent with that set
of paths and their edge annotations (because some flow types are noncomparable in
strength, there may not be a single strongest flow type). To describe this computation,
we first define two helper functions:
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extend : (FlowType × Annotation)→ FlowType
max : P(FlowType)→ P(FlowType)
The extend function takes a flow type t and extends it with an annotation ann—the
function returns the strongest flow type t′ which includes all the edge annotations cor-
responding to the flow type t as well as ann. For example, extend(type4, nonlocampexp ) =
type6, and extend(localamp , nonlocampexp ) = type5. The max function takes a set of flow
types and returns the strongest flow types in that set (again, since there are noncompa-
rable flow types there may not be a single strongest flow type in the set). For example,
max ({type4, type5, type6}) = {type4, type5}.
For each source we will compute a set of flow types for each statement in the PDG
reachable from that source; the final set of flow types are taken from the statements
corresponding to interesting sinks. Let FlowType(v) be the set of flow types assigned
to statement v, and initialize FlowType(v) = {type1} for all statements v. Then
compute the fix point over all v of the following equation:
FlowType(v) = max
 ⋃
v′
ann−−→v∈E
t∈FlowType(v′)
{extend(t, ann)}

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Intuitively, FlowType(v) gives the strongest set of flow types using which the source
under consideration can reach v. To compute this, we look at all the predecessors v′ of
v, and extend of the flow types computed at v′ with the edge annotation ann between
v′ and v, and keep only the strongest flow types amongst these. Because we consider
all the predecessors v′ of v and edges between v′ and v, we account for all the possible
paths from the source to v. Due to the presence of cycles in PDG, we compute a fixpoint
of these equations.
Consider the following PDG example to illustrate the flow type equation. Let the
PDG include the edges v1
nonlocampexp−−−−−−→ v3 and v2
nonlocampexp−−−−−−→ v3, with FlowType(v1) =
{type4, type5} and FlowType(v2) = {type3}. To compute
FlowType(v3), we first extend the flow types at predecessors v1 and v2 with the corre-
sponding edge annotations, and take their union to obtain {type6, type5}. We then
pick the strongest flow types from these to obtain FlowType(v3) = {type5}.
We compute the above fixpoint for the various statements with respect to each inter-
esting source in turn; the signature is created by taking the flow types at each interesting
sink. If for source src the sink snk has flow types {type1, type2}, then the signature
contains the entries src
type1−−−→ snk and src type2−−−→ snk .
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6.5 Inferring Network Domains
The most common way in which addons communicate with network domains is to
create a network request object XMLHttpRequest and pass it a string that contains
the desired URL. To generate precise signatures, our analysis should statically infer as
many of these URL strings as possible. However, a string constant analysis (analogous
to the traditional integer constant analysis) is insufficient to determine many of these
strings. Often an addon will communicate with the same domain, but dynamically
extend that domain’s URL with different suffixes, e.g., different arguments to the same
web application. Consider the following code which exemplifies a common pattern
found in addons:
var baseURL = "www.example.com/req?";
if (...) baseURL += "name"; else baseURL += "age";
// communicate with baseURL
A string constant analysis would infer baseURL to be an unknown string after the
conditional. Our insight is that, for inferring the network domain contained in the
string, we only need the URL’s prefix rather than the entire URL; e.g., in the example
above we need to infer only the base domain www.example.com/req? and not the
two URLs constructed from that base domain.
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Therefore, we augment the base JavaScript analysis (which uses a constant string
analysis) with a prefix string analysis in order to infer these network domain prefixes.
Our abstract prefix string domain is similar in concept to the prefix domain described
by Costantini et al. [48], except that we also track exact strings whenever possible—
because we use the same string domain for inferring URLs as well as object properties,
this is an important distinction for precision. We describe our abstract prefix string
domain and one example abstract string operation for that domain, string concatena-
tion. The complete prefix domain formalization and proof sketches of soundness are
contained in the supplemental materials.2
The prefix string abstract domain is a lattice L]p = (Pre,v,unionsq,u). Let  mean
string prefix and let ⊕ mean the greatest common prefix; then:
• Pre is a set of (string, boolean) pairs augmented with a bottom element: (str , b) ∈
Pre = (String × Boolean) ∪ {⊥}, such that b = true means str is an exact
string and b = false means str is a prefix of an unknown string.
• The bottom of the lattice ⊥ represents an uninitialized string value, and the top
of the lattice > = (, false) represents all possible strings.
• ⊥ v (str , b) v > for all (str , b) ∈ Pre, and (str 1, b1) v (str 2, b2) iff either
b2 = false and str 2  str 1, or b1 = true, b2 = true, and str 1 = str 2
2Available under the Downloads link at http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/˜pllab.
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• (str 1, b1) unionsq (str 2, b2) =

(str 1, b1) if str 1 = str 2, b1 = b2 = true
(str 1 ⊕ str 2, false) otherwise
• (str 1, b1) u (str 2, b2) =

(str 1, b1) if b2 = false, str2  str1
(str 2, b2) if b1 = false, str1  str2
⊥ otherwise
The lattice is noetherian, i.e., it meets the finite ascending chain condition. We
describe the abstract string concatenation operation + on the prefix domain as a repre-
sentative example of the set of required abstract operations. Let X be any element of
L]p; then:
• ⊥+X = X +⊥ = ⊥
• (str 1, true) + (str 2, b2) = (str 1 · str 2, b2)
• (str 1, false) + (str 2, b2) = (str 1, false)
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6.6 Evaluation
In this section we first briefly describe our analysis implementation and our bench-
marks and experimental methodology; we then describe and discuss our evaluation
results.
6.6.1 Implementation
We implement our signature inference analysis on top of JSAI [96], a flow- and
context-sensitive abstract interpreter for JavaScript. JSAI, and hence our analysis, is
implemented in Scala. The analysis is performed in three passes: (1) use JSAI to
compute the CFG and read/write sets; (2) construct the annotated PDG as described in
Section 6.3; and (3) infer the signature as described in Section 6.4.
We extend JSAI in two ways for our analysis. First, we augment JSAI’s abstract
string domain with the prefix string domain described in Section 6.5. Second, we ex-
tend JSAI to handle browser-embedded code: we provide manually-written stubs for
the native APIs (e.g., DOM and XPCOM APIs) used by our benchmarks, and sim-
ulate the addon event-handling loop by adding a loop at the end of the addon that
non-deterministically executes all registered event handlers. Our implementation is
available under the Downloads link at http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/˜pllab.
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6.6.2 Benchmarks and Methodology
Our benchmark suite consists of real addons taken from the Mozilla addon reposi-
tory [2]. All of these addons were vetted manually by Mozilla before being added to the
repository, and have been present in the repository for years. Table 6.1 lists the addons,
their intended purpose, and their size. The size is given as the number of AST nodes
parsed by Rhino [1], a more accurate representation than number of lines of code. All
of these addons, along with a set of tests showing various kinds of information flows,
are bundled with our implementation.
For expository purposes, we classify the addons into three categories based on each
addon’s summary submitted by its developer:
Category A: Addons intended to explicitly send the current URL information to
a specified domain. For example, LivePageRank, which sends the active URL
over the network to find out its page rank.
Category B: Addons intended to implicitly send information about the current
URL or user key presses to a specified domain. For example, YoutubeDownloader
will check whether the current URL is in fact youtube.com before attempting
to download a video.
Category C: Addons intended to communicate with a specified domain, but
without sending any interesting information. For example, Chess.comNotifier
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will communicate with chess.com to find out whose turn it is to play. These
addons exemplify API usage discovery, using network communication as the API
of interest.
In order to check the precision of our inferred signatures, we first manually write a
signature for each addon based on its developer-provided summary (this is done before
we automatically infer any signatures). We can then use the manual signatures to com-
pare against the automatically inferred signatures: if the inferred signatures are weaker
(allow more flows) than the manual signature, it indicates either a false positive or a
misleading addon summary. We give an example manual signature for one addon in
each category:
• LivePageRank (A): url type1−−−→ send(toolbarqueries.google.com).
Rationale: its stated purpose is to display the page rank of the active URL, com-
puted by sending the URL to toolbarqueries.google.com.
• HyperTranslate (B): key type3−−−→ send(translate.google.com). Ra-
tionale: it translates selected text by using a web service, but only if the keys
pressed by the user match its defined keyboard shortcuts. Thus, the addon can
implicitly reveal information about key presses to the domain translate.
google.com. Because the addon continuously listens for key presses, this in-
formation flow can be amplified.
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• Chess.comNotifier (C): send(chess.com). Rationale: it does not reveal
information about any interesting sources over the network, but it does commu-
nicate with chess.com about game status.
We also measure the time taken by the analysis to infer signatures for each bench-
mark. Our main purpose is to show that the analysis time is reasonable; our prototype
implementation is written with emphasis on correctness rather than performance, and
there are multiple opportunities for improving the performance of our implementation.
We divide the time taken into three phases:
Phase 1 (P1): time taken by the base analysis to compute information assumed
as input to our annotated PDG construction.
Phase 2 (P2): time taken to construct the annotate PDG as described in Sec-
tion 6.3.
Phase 3 (P3): time taken to convert the annotated PDG into a signature as de-
scribed in Section 6.4.2.
To compute the timing results we run the analysis 11 times on each benchmark,
discard the first result, and report the median of the remaining runs. The timing in-
formation is obtained on a Mac OS X 2.3 GHz Intel Core i7 machine with 8GB of
RAM.
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6.6.3 Results and Discussion
Table 6.2 summarizes the result of signature inference analysis on the benchmarks.
For each addon, the analysis result is summarized as pass (the inferred signature matches
the manual signature); fail (the inferred signature has more flows than the manual signa-
ture, and manual inspection determined they were false positives); or leak (the inferred
signature has more flows and manual inspection determined they were real). The times
are given separately for each analysis phase, as described in Section 6.6.2. The total
time taken by the analysis for each of the addons is under one minute.
Five of the addons passed. Of the remainder, two failed and three had unintended
leaks. We discuss the failures and leaks in more detail below.
Failed Addons The inferred signatures for LessSpamPlease and
VKVideoDownloader fail simply because the analysis was not able to determine the
exact network domain being communicated with. For example, VKVideoDownloader
checks whether the current URL is one of three different video player domains, and
communicates with the corresponding domain. Our prefix abstract string domain is
not expressive enough to precisely represent all three domains, and hence infers the
final domain to be unknown. It is worth noting that in the remaining eight out of the
ten addons, our prefix string analysis can determine the exact domains with which the
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addons communicate. Both failed signatures had the correct information flow sources,
sinks, and flow types; the only imprecision was in the network domain.
Leaky Addons YoutubeDownloader computes a video id taken directly from the
current URL and sends it to youtube.com; this is a real explicit information flow.
While this is probably an acceptable flow, it was not described in the developer’s addon
summary and hence was unexpected. GoogleTransliterate communicates with
the transliterate web API only if the current URL is not about:blank (i.e., the empty
page); this is an real implicit information flow, though again probably harmless. These
examples highlight the usefulness of using security signatures rather than checking
against a fixed policy: rather than a simple pass/fail result, the signature allows the
addon vetter to easily determine what types of flows are present and whether they are
acceptable or not.
Pinpoints is an interesting case. Besides communicating with yourpinpoints.
com (as indicated in the developer summary), it also communicates with maps.google.
com. It required careful reading of the extended addon description and the addon code
to determine that this was actually intended behavior that should have been included in
the addon summary (the addon uses information from the Google Maps API to improve
the information it saves). This illustrates another benefit of our signature inference, by
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Addon Name Result Time Taken(s)
P1 P2 P3
LivePagerank pass 15.9 30.3 0.5
LessSpamPlease fail 4.0 24.0 0.1
YoutubeDownloader leak 13.2 22.4 0.2
VKVideoDownloader fail 0.7 8.7 0.1
HyperTranslate pass 9.6 30.9 0.3
Chess.comNotifier pass 0.8 2.1 0.1
CoffeePodsDeals pass 0.4 2.7 0.1
oDeskJobWatcher pass 0.4 0.9 0.1
PinPoints leak 3.6 16.9 0.1
GoogleTransliterate leak 1.8 10.87 0.1
Table 6.2: Addon signature inference result summary. An addon is marked pass if
the inferred signature has no more flows than the manual signature; fail if it has more
flows and they are false positives; and leak if it has more flows and they are real. The
last three columns indicate the time taken by the inference analysis, divided into three
phases as outlined in Section 6.6.2. All times are given in seconds.
highlighting flows that are undocumented or only documented in the addon’s fine print.
6.7 Related Work
There have been a number of previous efforts targeting either information flow se-
curity, security analysis specific to JavaScript, or browser addon security. In this section
we discuss those efforts most relevant to our own work.
Secure Information Flow There are decades of work on secure information flow; for
details see the survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [127]. Most of this work is based on type
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systems. There is some existing work on using abstract interpretation [43,55], however
they do not target any language nearly as complex and difficult to analyze as JavaScript.
Abadi et al. [29] establish a close connection between secure information flow and
program slicing using dependencies. Hammer et al. [80] present an information flow
analysis for Java bytecode using PDGs. They use a traditional lattice-based approach
for their analysis, and apply it to a different language and domain than we do. They
also do not attempt to distinguish between the different kinds of information flows.
Security Analysis for JavaScript There have been both static and dynamic (e.g.,
[83, 86]) approaches to JavaScript analysis; here we focus specifically on those that
contain some static component (e.g., [34,85,88,89,134,142]), as well as some security
component. These analyses target client-side webpage JavaScript programs rather than
JavaScript-based browser addons, which present different challenges and opportunities.
Justet al. [91] blend static and dynamic analyses; they track information flow dy-
namically as much as possible, but resort to static analysis to capture implicit flows.
Because of dynamic tracking, their approach requires changes to the JavaScript run-
time and incurs an average overhead of 150%.
Guarnieri and Livshits [72] define a statically analyzable subset of JavaScript and
implement a tool to enforce certain security and reliability policies on JavaScript wid-
gets. They use dynamic checks to make certain the executing widget code is within the
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defined subset language. Their security policy is not formally specified and it is not
clear whether they handle only explicit flows or also track implicit flows.
Chugh et al. [47] propose a hybrid mechanism to check certain specific types of
malicious information flow in client-side JavaScript. Since client-side JavaScript (un-
like browser addons) are allowed to dynamically load new code, they cannot perform
a whole-program analysis. Instead, their tool performs a static analysis on all available
code and infers a set of dynamic checks necessary to enforce security. Their technique
does not scale to more general information flow policies.
Keil and Theimann [99] propose a type-based dependency analysis for JavaScript,
and formalize their analysis for a subset of JavaScript. Their analysis can be viewed as
static counterpart to data tainting, and they build a tool over the TAJS [89] framework.
While not a security analysis, they claim that their analysis could be used as a basis for
investigating various security properties.
Browser Addon Security Browser addon security has also attracted much attention.
Barth et al. [44] propose a new browser addon architecture (which is now adopted by
the Chrome web browser) that reduces the attack surface of addons. They achieve this
by separating out addons into components with different privileges and isolating the
components by running them in different processes. While Chrome requires the addon
to explicitly request access for different privileges, it does not perform any information-
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flow based reasoning to figure out what the addons do with accessible information and
whether any confidential information is being leaked.
Guha et al. [77] describe IBEX, a framework to develop and verify secure browser
addons. IBEX requires developers to write browser addons in a dependently-typed
language called Fine. Their tool can statically check if addons conform to policies
specified in a Datalog-like policy language, but only if the addons are written in Fine,
requiring extensive developer effort.
Dhawan and Ganapathy [58] describe SABRE, a system that guards against Firefox
addon security flaws by performing in-browser dynamic information flow tracking of
JavaScript addons. SABRE requires extensive modifications to the browser and the
execution-time cost of SABRE is high. Djeric and Goel [59] present another dynamic
taint tracking analysis for Firefox addons which has similar characteristics. In contrast,
we perform a static analysis of the addons; this means that there is no runtime cost
and that reviewers can use their discretion to ignore warnings that turn out to be false
positives.
Bandhakavi et al. [40] describe VEX, a static tool for highlighting potential secu-
rity vulnerabilities in Firefox addons. VEX performs an unsound (by design) static
taint analysis of JavaScript code (tracking only explicit leaks) with the intent of finding
certain types of vulnerability bugs.
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Beacon [94] is a static analysis tool to detect capability leaks in Firefox Jetpack
extensions (which is a library of modules that makes writing addons much easier).
While Beacon detects capability leaks between modules and over-privileged modules,
their analysis is unsound by design, and cannot perform information-flow reasoning.
Lerner et. al. [107] present a type-system based approach to verify compliance of
JavaScript-based addons with Private-Browsing mode. This requires some annotation
effort and cannot perform information-flow reasoning.
6.8 Conclusion
Browser addons written using JavaScript are extremely popular, but they can be
easily exploited by malicious developers. We develop a static analysis to automatically
infer security signatures for browser addons. Security signatures summarize uses of
security critical APIs, as well as interesting information flows augmented with how they
occur in addons. These signatures can be used to understand the behavior of addons
with regard to security much more easily than having to go through the entire addon
source code manually. Inference of security signatures can be employed to automate
addon vetting with very little manual intervention. In our evaluation, we demonstrate
the usefulness of our strategy by applying our analysis to ten real browser addons from
the official Mozilla addon repository.
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Conclusions
JavaScript’s popularity has virtually spread to every platform, no longer making it
just a language for the web. This has created an urgent need for semantic tools for
JavaScript—a static analysis platform for JavaScript can fuel such tools. This the-
sis shows that our open-source artifact JSAI is a sound, configurable, fast and precise
static analysis platform for JavaScript, with formally specified concrete and abstract se-
mantics for JavaScript. We show how to systematically construct abstract interpreters
that are widely configurable with arbitrary control-flow sensitivities in a modular fash-
ion, and use these insights in building JSAI. We use type refinement to improve JSAI’s
precision, and novel parallelization techniques to improve JSAI’s performance. We
build multiple clients for JavaScript using JSAI, including a security auditing client for
vetting browser addons written in JavaScript.
We envision JSAI to form a research platform for easy experimentation with ab-
stract domains, context-, heap-, path-sensitivities and other control-flow sensitivities
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that might be novel to JavaScript. JSAI also computes rich amount of semantic in-
formation needed to fuel a number of clients. We are currently working on multiple
clients (some in collaboration with other teams), including, amongst others, a DOM-
based XSS detection client for the web, and a program understanding client with the
intent to identify analysis false-posties quickly.
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